On the Russellian Reformation

Abstract

Recently, an orthodox Russellian tenet has come under fire from within. In particular, some Russellians now argue that definite descriptions don't semantically encode uniqueness. Instead, Reformed Russellians, as I call them, hold that definite descriptions are truth-theoretically identical to indefinite ones. On this approach, a definite description's uniqueness reading becomes a matter of pragmatics, not semantics. These reforms, we're told, provide both empirical and methodological benefits over and above the prevailing orthodoxy. As I argue, however, the Russellian Reformation contains serious flaws. Indeed, it is Orthodox Russellianism that remains a superior choice, both empirically and conceptually.

Syntax and Interpretation

“…2 2 These puzzles are directly correlated with the monotonic features of the quantifier phrases under discussion. See Neale, 2004 and Pupa, 2010. …”

Definite descriptions and negative existential quantifiers

“…Footnote 1 continued (2007a, b), Pupa (2010Pupa ( , 2013, Abrusán and Szendr} oi (2013), and Jandrić (2014), among others. One also hears defences of it in conversation and in seminars, often by people who are worried about giving up bivalence.…”