2015
DOI: 10.1111/jsbm.12083
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On the Relevance of Agency Conflicts in SME Debt Maturity Structure

Abstract: Previous theoretical research asserts that an optimal policy of debt maturity structure mitigates the various agency conflicts that arise through debt contracts. We test this hypothesis on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs), which are very sensitive to agency problems. Such problems mainly arise between owners and debt providers, due to SMEs recording high growth and having few fixed assets and informational asymmetry. We provide evidence on the relevant effect of underinvestment, asset substitution, an… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(4 citation statements)
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References 58 publications
(86 reference statements)
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“…Larger companies are likely to be more diversified, and thus might be subjected to higher agency and bureaucratic costs (Choi et al, 2007). Small firms may also have trouble in minimising agency problems (Lopez-Gracia & Mestre-Barberá, 2015). However, some studies state that small companies are frequently managed and owned by only one person and thus do not face this issue (Lopez-Gracia & Mestre-Barberá, 2015).…”
Section: Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Larger companies are likely to be more diversified, and thus might be subjected to higher agency and bureaucratic costs (Choi et al, 2007). Small firms may also have trouble in minimising agency problems (Lopez-Gracia & Mestre-Barberá, 2015). However, some studies state that small companies are frequently managed and owned by only one person and thus do not face this issue (Lopez-Gracia & Mestre-Barberá, 2015).…”
Section: Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Small firms may also have trouble in minimising agency problems (Lopez-Gracia & Mestre-Barberá, 2015). However, some studies state that small companies are frequently managed and owned by only one person and thus do not face this issue (Lopez-Gracia & Mestre-Barberá, 2015). For this study, firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.…”
Section: Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Another way to hinder selfish managerial behaviours is to reduce free cash flow, which can be inefficiently employed by managers to the detriment of shareholders (managerial overinvestment or free cash flow problem) (Lopez-Gracia & Mestre-Barberá, 2015). This reduction can be obtained through increasing leverage (Jensen, 1986).…”
Section: The Relationships Between Owners and Managers In Family Firmmentioning
confidence: 99%