On the Putative Epistemic Generativity of Memory and Imagination

Miyazono, Kengo; Tooming, Uku

doi:10.4324/9781003153429-9

Cited by 2 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…In these cases, it is not the case that imagination merely turns pre-existing propositional justification from another source at T1 into doxastic justification at T2; after all, S was not propositionally justified to believe that P by another source at T1. We argued elsewhere (Miyazono & Tooming, 2022) that our generation/preservation distinction is more plausible than Lackey's (2005) distinction. Lackey, in her discussion of memory, defines preservationism as follows: S knows (justifiedly believes/rationally believes) that P on the basis of memory at T2 only if (i) S knows (justifiedly believes/rationally believes) that P at an earlier time T1, and (ii) S acquired the knowledge that P (justification with respect to P /rationality with respect to P) at T1 via a source other than memory.…”

Section: Defining Generationism/preservationismmentioning

confidence: 71%

“…Imagination is arguably a psychologically generative process; when I imagine a golden mountain, which I haven't seen before, the imaginative representation of the golden mountain is something generated rather than something merely preserved, say, from my prior perceptual experience of golden things and mountains. We have argued elsewhere (Miyazono & Tooming, 2022) that psychological generativity and epistemological generativity are not only conceptually distinct but also theoretically independent; in particular, the former does not imply the latter.…”

Section: Defining Generationism/preservationismmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…For our discussion in this paper, we need a more precise characterization of the generation/preservation distinction. Here is our proposal (Miyazono & Tooming, 2022):…”

Section: Defining Generationism/preservationismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Does this case satisfy both JUSTIFICATION and NOPRIOR? There is a difficulty of regarding this to be a generative case, which can be expressed in the form of a dilemma (Miyazono & Tooming, 2022). The hunter's imagination is either properly constrained or not.…”

Section: Generationism About Imaginationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As we will see, our main examples concern sensory imagination (or, as we ourselves prefer to put it, episodic imagination; Miyazono & Tooming, 2022) because sensory imagination provides the case for which the prospects of arguing for generationism are the most promising. This means that our argument for generationism primarily focuses on a particular kind of imagination (i.e., sensory imagination) rather than all kinds of imagination.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Imagination as a generative source of justification

Miyazono

Tooming

2023

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One of the most exciting debates in philosophy of imagination in recent years has been over the epistemic use of imagination where imagination epistemically contributes to justifying beliefs and acquiring knowledge. This paper defends “generationism about imagination” according to which imagination is a generative source, rather than a preservative source, of justification. In other words, imagination generates new justification above and beyond prior justification provided by other sources. After clarifying the generation/preservation distinction (Section 2), we present an argument for generationism about imagination, which can be divided into two parts; the philosophical part and the empirical part. In the philosophical part of our argument (Section 3), we claim that generationism about imagination follows from what we call “INACCESSIBILITY”. According to INACCESSIBILITY, imagination is properly constrained by the imaginative constrainers (i.e., the prior representations that constrain the development of a scenario in imagination) to which non‐imaginative belief‐forming processes do not have access. In the empirical part of our argument (Section 4), we claim that INACCESSIBILITY is plausible in light of relevant studies and theories in the empirical literature, especially the literature on mental simulation (Section 4.1), core cognition (Section 4.2), and intuitive physics (Section 4.3).

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Section: Defining Generationism/preservationismmentioning

confidence: 71%

Section: Defining Generationism/preservationismmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…For our discussion in this paper, we need a more precise characterization of the generation/preservation distinction. Here is our proposal (Miyazono & Tooming, 2022):…”

Section: Defining Generationism/preservationismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Generationism About Imaginationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Imagination as a generative source of justification

Miyazono

Tooming

2023

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Prospects for epistemic generationism about memory

Tooming,

Miyazono

2024

PhiMiSci

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A source of epistemic justification can be either preservative or generative, in that it can either just preserve justification that was provided by some other source or generate justification on its own. This paper asks what is required for generationism about memory to be true and argues that there are rather demanding conditions that a case of memory justification needs to satisfy in order to count as epistemically generative in a substantive sense. By considering a parallel argument for epistemically generative cases of imagination and drawing from empirical data on event completion, we argue that there are such cases of memory justification because the way in which memory processes fill in the content of event memories suggests that memory is fit to provide justification about past events that is not due to a source other than memory.

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On the Putative Epistemic Generativity of Memory and Imagination

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Imagination as a generative source of justification

Imagination as a generative source of justification

Prospects for epistemic generationism about memory

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