In his theory of cognitive dissonance, Festinger (1957) described cognitive consistency as a psychological need that is as basic as hunger and thirst. Over the past decades, however, the idea of cognitive consistency as a core motive has been replaced by an increasingly narrow focus on dissonance-related changes in attitudes and alternative accounts that attribute such changes to mechanisms of ego-defense. The current article aims at reviving the idea of cognitive consistency as a core motive, arguing that inconsistency serves as an epistemic cue for errors in one's system of beliefs. Because inconsistency can often be resolved in multiple ways, motivated reasoning can bias processes of inconsistency resolution toward desired conclusions, although motivated distortions are constrained by the need for cognitive consistency. The ubiquity of consistency processes is illustrated through its role in various instances of threat-compensation (e.g., victim derogation, self-verification, system justification) and the insights that can be gained from reconceptualizing various social psychological phenomena in terms of cognitive consistency (e.g., prejudice-related belief systems, dispositional inference, stability of first impressions).Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance is arguably one of the most influential theories in the history of social psychology. The theory postulates that inconsistent cognitions elicit an aversive state of arousal (i.e., dissonance), which in turn produces a desire to reduce the underlying inconsistency and to maintain a state of consonance. 1 Although Festinger was convinced that the psychological need for cognitive consistency is as basic as hunger and thirst, several revisions 1. Although Festinger (1957) preferred the term dissonance over inconsistency, it seems useful to distinguish between the inconsistency of cognitive elements and the aversive feeling of dissonance that is assumed to arise from inconsistent cognitive elements (see .