On the political economy of means-tested education vouchers

Bearse, Peter; Glomm, Gerhard; Ravikumar, B.

doi:10.1016/s0014-2921(99)00045-8

Cited by 38 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…In this discrete choice regime, households can opt out of public education, sending their children to private schools instead, albeit at their own cost. 2 Other work on education vouchers includes Nechyba (1999Nechyba ( , 2000, Cohen-Zada and Justman (2003,2005), Ferreyra (2007), and Bearse, Glomm, and Ravikumar (2000).…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This phenomenon is not limited to the United States; education voucher proposals of a scope greater than that of an experimental level are rare in other countries as well. 1 Instead, the coexistence of public and private education seems to be the predominant institutional arrangement (see James, 1987).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some households use their after-tax income to supplement vouchers (and reduce their expenditures on other goods), while others do not. 1 West (1997) and Carnoy (1997) provide descriptions and di¤ering interpretations of these experiments.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

Bearse

Cardak

Glomm

et al. 2013

European Journal of Political Economy

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We compare a uniform voucher regime against the status quo mix of public and private education, focusing on the distribtuion of welfare gains and losses across households by income. We argue that the topping-up option available under uniform vouchers is not su¢ ciently valuable for the poorer households, so the voucher regime is defeated at the polls. Our result depends critically on the opting-out feature in the current system.We are thankful for helpful comments from Marco Basetto,

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Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

Bearse

Cardak

Glomm

et al. 2013

European Journal of Political Economy

Self Cite

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“…Moreover, too many still model the redistributive effect of differential weighting of vouchers by, for example, household income, without making sufficiently realistic assumptions about the differential elasticity of the supply-side response (for example, Bearse et al, 2000).…”

Section: Segregationist Preferencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Giving Consumers of British Public Services More Choice: What can be Learned from Recent History?

Perri¹

2003

J. Soc. Pol.

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British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced in the autumn of 2001 that he wanted to extend individual consumer choice in the public services (Blair, 2001). What do we know from recent experience about the conditions under which such policies can be sustained? In this article, the experience of individual consumer choice over the last ten, and in some cases, fifteen years, is compared across nine fields of British public services. The article identifies the policy goals for introducing choice, considers how far they were typically achieved, and identifies problems and unintended side-effects, including distributional problems, inefficiencies and one type of political risk. This provisional evaluation is based on a widely ranging review of literature spanning several disciplines. The principal products of the argument are two detailed tables, setting out, respectively, the degree to which the goals seem to have been achieved for each choice programme, as far as the available literature can tell us, and how far distributional, efficiency and political risk problems have dogged consumer choice in each field. In the discussion section, trends and variations are summarised. Finally, some lessons are drawn from the comparisons, for policy makers who may be considering the further extension of consumer choice in public services.

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“…See e.g Fernandez and Rogerson (1995),Epple and Romano (1996a),Blomquist and Bergstrom (1996),and Bearse, Glomm and Ravikumar (2000)…”

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confidence: 99%

Inefficient households and the mix of government spending

Anderberg

2006

Public Choice

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A model is presented in which individuals can vote over government subsidies to a private good and over redistributive taxation. The subsidized good is purchased and shared by couples who act noncooperatively, while possibly being altruistic towards each other. The framework allows a separation of the subsidy policy from redistributive policy. In a majority voting equilibrium the subsidy is used exclusively to correct the individuals' spending pattern. The results suggest that spending on private goods should be an important item in government expenditures when there is strong positive income bias in the political process and/or when household decisions are relatively inefficient. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007Family behavior{, Public Policy, Government expenditure mix,

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On the political economy of means-tested education vouchers

Cited by 38 publications

References 12 publications

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

Why do education vouchers fail at the ballot box?

Giving Consumers of British Public Services More Choice: What can be Learned from Recent History?

Inefficient households and the mix of government spending

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