On the peaceful disposition of military dictatorships

Andreski, Stanislav

doi:10.1080/01402398008437052

Cited by 41 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Acemoglu, Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) follow a similar approach with a model where the military can act as an agent of the elite; they use the model to provide micro- 5 The garrison state view is associated with Harold Laswell (1937Laswell ( , 1941, who was concerned with the increasing militarization of society in Japan and Germany before the Second World War; the second view is due to Stanislav Andreski (1968Andreski ( , 1980 and has been used to explain civilian control of the U.S. and Soviet militaries during the Cold War (Desch, 1999). 4 foundations for the role played by the military in the literature on political transitions Robinson, 2001, 2005).…”

Section: ; Jackson and Morelli 2008)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4 foundations for the role played by the military in the literature on political transitions Robinson, 2001, 2005). 6 Their model also predicts when the military will disobey the elite, overthrow it, and establish a military dictatorship. Our model differs in that it is focused on the military's role in policy-making, rather than on transitions.…”

Section: ; Jackson and Morelli 2008)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An important related paper is Londregan and Poole (1990), who nd that income per capita, economic growth and the 6 Leon (2007) considers a similar relationship between a government and its military, but from an empirical perspective. Related studies of the military, but focused on different issues, include Finer (1962), Nordlinger (1977) and Leon (2006).…”

Section: ; Jackson and Morelli 2008)mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Soldiers or Bureaucrats? Conflict and the Military's Role in Policy-Making

León

2009

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

for their help and comments. I kindly acknowledge the financial support of the ESRC. AbstractOne of the most striking institutional features of many less developed countries is that their militaries are closely involved in policy-making, potentially having a large impact on economic outcomes. This paper examines the role of the military in setting policy. For this purpose it develops one of the first models of the military, where its political involvement can take two forms: direct when the military runs the government, and indirect when it influences policy without governing directly. We focus on civilian regimes and find that war decreases the payoff to the military from both forms of involvement, but also makes staging successful coups easier. In equilibrium, an increase in the likelihood of war makes indirect involvement less likely; its impact on coups, which are aimed at establishing direct control, is nonmonotonic. We show empirical evidence for this non-monotonic relationship, with coups being least likely for low and high probabilities of war.JEL Codes: O38, O17, H11, H56, D72.

show abstract

Section: ; Jackson and Morelli 2008)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: ; Jackson and Morelli 2008)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: ; Jackson and Morelli 2008)mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Soldiers or Bureaucrats? Conflict and the Military's Role in Policy-Making

León

2009

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Dictators who feel they must systematically weaken the military in order to construct a "coup-proof" regime tend to limit the Army's capability, with the side-effect of diminishing their country's capacity to fight an international conflict (Quinlivan 1999). In fact, already back in the Cold War times scholars identified that some non-democratic regimes had "peaceful dispositions" by necessity, because the more often they used the Army for domestic purposes (policing society, as the Belarusian and Turkmen regimes 12 are known to do), the less capable they were of waging war (Andreski 1980). Whereas the analysis of quantitative data from the Polity IV data reveals a mixed picture, more convincing explanations of the observed variations in conflict-propensity can be found by scrutinizing the different types of authoritarian regime involved.…”

Section: Supra)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia’s Arlington? The Federal Military Memorial Cemetery near Moscow

Gabowitsch¹

2016

JSPPS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Therefore, many military dictatorships opt instead to be war-averse and in this vein they restrain the sponsored terrorist groups whenever war seems to be a real possibility. 44 …”

Section: Coercive Strategy 2: Threatening To Change the Strategic Conmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coercing Weak Regimes to Stop Supporting Terrorism: How and When It Can Be Done

Honig

2013

Comparative Strategy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Scholars tend to pessimistically argue that the weaker a regime is the harder it becomes for international actors to coerce it to fight the terrorist groups that it harbors/sponsors, since weak regimes are afraid that taking such an unpopular step could critically undermine their stability. Yet, this argument ignores the policy option that the coercing actor has of threatening to take steps which would undermine the stability of the weak regime unless it ceases its support for terrorist groups. Such a regime-threatening coercive strategy can overcome the problem of the weak regime's lack of political incentives because if the threat is credible, even a weak regime may conclude that it is politically cheaper to suppress the terrorists than face an externally triggered regime destabilization. Since weak regimes often care more about their survival than about national security interests, the regime-threatening coercive strategy has the best chances for success against such regimes. This article presents three different regime-threatening military coercive strategies and explores the conditions under which they are likely to be successful.

show abstract

On the peaceful disposition of military dictatorships

Cited by 41 publications

References 0 publications

Soldiers or Bureaucrats? Conflict and the Military's Role in Policy-Making

Soldiers or Bureaucrats? Conflict and the Military's Role in Policy-Making

Russia’s Arlington? The Federal Military Memorial Cemetery near Moscow

Coercing Weak Regimes to Stop Supporting Terrorism: How and When It Can Be Done

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About