On the Origins of the Philosophy of Thought Experiments: The Forerun

Abstract

The history of thought experiments is now gaining a great deal of attention, and this is due to the renewed interest of philosophers on the subject. This paper inquires into the history of the philosophy of thought experiments. We name the period to be examined in this paper the "forerun." Its main stakeholders are Georg C. Lichtenberg, Novalis, and Immanuel Kant. We will present and discuss the work of each of them in order to characterize the period, and then reveal parallels and lessons that apply to more recently proposed accounts of thought experiments.Philosophical debate about the nature and function of thought experiments would be impoverished without good historical sources. And while valuable work is being done on the history of thought experiments, a comprehensive discussion of the history of philosophical investigation into thought experiments is still absent in the literature (but see Kühne 2005;Moue et al. 2006). In what follows we take the ªrst steps towards providing a more complete picture of the diverse attempts to shed light on thought experiments.The term "thought experiment" made its ªrst appearance about 200 years ago in 1811. The most proliªc period in the history of the philosophical investigation into thought experiments is the current one, which commenced about 175 years later, more or less in 1986. The lack of focus and direction in the ongoing debate over the nature and usefulness of thought experiments is our main motivation to revisit the history of philosophical investigation into thought experiments. We are conªdent that this enterprise can help to correct some of the shortcomings in current approaches to thought experiments, including a lack of appreciation of the literary features of thought experiments, the normativity of scientiªc instances in assessing the nature of thought experiments, and a ten-

Thought Experiment between Revealed Theology and Narrative

“…However, as we shall see in this second part of the paper, it is possible, bearing in mind the indirect link between thought and action in the face of theological questions, to recognize the cognitive value of the theological thought experiment, especially if we consider the narrative function of the thought experiment and the relationship of unity, on the one hand, and distinction, on the other, between theological and literary thought experiments (cf. Fehige 2009aFehige , 2009bFehige , 2011Fehige , 2012Fehige , 2019Fehige and Stuart 2014;Stuart et al 2018). The art of narration can be understood as a means by which, in theology, as in fiction, the ability to imagine possible scenarios succeeds in exerting an indirect or reflexive influence on our lived experience.…”

Investigating the Purposes of Thought Experiments: Based on the Students’ Performance

“…Students used TEs to verify whether their hypothesis is correct or incorrect or to provide further explanation about their hypothesis. Similarly, scientists also used TEs as cognitive tools in developing and supporting their hypotheses and theories (Galili, 2009;Thagard, 2014;Fehige & Stuart, 2014). Also, both scientists and students used TEs as an argumentation tool.…”

“…However, some questions related to the use of TEs for students in schools have not been clearly answered. For example, if physicists generally use TEs as a creative ability device to support and refute the existing theories or to produce new theories (Brown, 1991;Galili, 2009;Thagard, 2014;Fehige & Stuart, 2014), do students use TEs with the same goals as scientists? If not, then what is the function of this imagination tool for students as a representation of non-experts?.…”

Philosophical Conceptual Analysis as an Experimental Method

“…The literature on scienti c experiment is massive (for example, Ackermann 1985, Batens & Van Bendegem 1988, Bogen & Woodward 1988, Cartwright 1983, Collins & Pinch 1993, Franklin 1986, Galison 1987, 1997, Gooding 1990, Gooding et al 1989, Hacking 1983, Latour & Woolgar 1986, Pickering 1985, Pinch 1986). Yet aside from a few German Idealists, very few have written about experimenting with concepts as linguistic entities (see Fehige & Stuart 2014). After presenting the problem from experimental philosophy in more detail, I look at conceptual experimentation from two sides.…”