On the Optimal Choice of Enforcement Technology: An Efficiency Explanation of the ECHR

On the role of the exclusionary rule for optimal law enforcement effort

“…This created a wedge between the optimal enforcement effort of the enforcement authority and the level that maximized welfare. The explicit consideration of privacy rights would presumably work in the same direction, as it is often argued that the enforcement authority does not internalize the costs imposed on individuals whose houses have been searched, whereas this should be reflected in welfare (Garoupa, ). Thus, concerns about privacy would only amplify the possible benefits of the exclusionary rule.…”

“…Further, the analysis in this article does not rely on the possibility of police corruption. Garoupa () describes an efficiency rationale for the respect of privacy rights (meaning limited search and seizure, for example) in a model in which there is a trade‐off between the level of deterrence, privacy rights, and legal errors. In contrast to the present inquiry, there exists no disconnect between the enforcement authority and the social planner, ruling out the link we are interested in.…”

Criminal procedure

“…SeeGaroupa (2007) for a more formal analysis of the trade-off between protecting the privacy rights of criminal suspects and crime prevention. He develops this analysis in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, which strengthens procedural protections of criminal defendants, refl ecting an increase in C in condition (5.8).Gerrit De Geest -10.4337/9781781950210.00010 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 11/26/2018 09:41:50AM via free access…”