On the observational equivalence of continuous-time deterministic and indeterministic descriptions

Werndl, Charlotte

doi:10.1007/s13194-010-0011-5

Cited by 24 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Moreover, several results show how, given stochastic descriptions of the type used in science, one can find deterministic descriptions of the type used in science which, relative to certain observation functions, are observationally equivalent to these stochastic descriptions. For instance, given Markov descriptions (Example 4), one can find discrete-time Newtonian descriptions which are observationally equivalent to these Markov descriptions (see Werndl 2009aWerndl , 2011 7 There are other results in the literature which are based on quite different assumptions but which could also be interpreted as results about observational equivalence between deterministic and stochastic descriptions. An example is Smith (2001, 2004); they present results under the ideal condition of infinite past observations of a deterministic system and the assumption that there is observational error modeled by a probability distribution around the true value.…”

Section: The Results On Observational Equivalencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…An answer will now be proposed when one has to choose between a deterministic description (X, f t , P ) derivable from Newtonian theory and a stochastic description {Z t } which is not derivable from any theory (cf. Werndl 2009c and2011). This includes the particle that bounces off several mirrors (Example 1), the two hard spheres moving in a box (Example 2) as well as the examples discussed by the extant literature (Suppes 1993, Suppes and de Barros 1996, Winnie 1998.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, all that will be said holds analogously also for continuous-time descriptions. An intuitive characterisation of the discretetime descriptions will be given; for the technical details the reader is referred to Werndl (2009aWerndl ( , 2011.…”

Section: Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evidence for the Deterministic or the Indeterministic Description? A Critique of the Literature About Classical Dynamical Systems

Werndl

2012

J Gen Philos Sci

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It can be shown that certain kinds of classical deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions are observationally equivalent. In these cases there is a choice between deterministic and indeterministic descriptions. Therefore, the question arises of which description, if any, is preferable relative to evidence. This paper looks at the main argument in the literature (by Winnie, 1998) that the deterministic description is preferable. It will be shown that this argument yields the desired conclusion relative to in principle possible observations where there are no limits, in principle, on observational accuracy. Yet relative to the currently possible observations (the kind of choice of relevance in practice), relative to the actual observations, or relative to in principle observations where there are limits, in principle, on observational accuracy the argument fails because it also applies to situations where the indeterministic description is preferable. Then the paper comments on Winnie's (1998) analogy between his argument for the deterministic description and his argument against the prevalence of Bernoulli randomness in deterministic descriptions. It is argued that while there is indeed an analogy, it is also important to see that the arguments are disanalogous in another sense.

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Section: The Results On Observational Equivalencementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evidence for the Deterministic or the Indeterministic Description? A Critique of the Literature About Classical Dynamical Systems

Werndl

2012

J Gen Philos Sci

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“…I now introduce the relevant deterministic and indeterministic descriptions informally; for the technical details see Werndl (2011). There are two kinds of descriptions: either the time-parameter varies discretely or continually.…”

Section: Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recently some results have been presented which show that certain kinds of deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions are observationally equivalent (Werndl 2009a, Werndl 2011. These results prompt interesting philosophical questions, such as what exactly they show or whether the deterministic or indeterministic description is preferable.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Observational Equivalence of Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions and the Role of Different Observations

Werndl

2011

EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009

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On the Possibility of Feminist Philosophy of Physics

Harrell

2015

Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science

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Physics is, like all sciences, not simply a collection of theories about how the world works. Theories and models of the world obviously play a critical role in physics, but they do not fully define the science. Rather, physics is an activity done by human beings with their attendant values, interests, and cognitive biases, in a complex, noisy world that does not come to us "carved at its joints." The dynamic nature of physics-the discovery, justification, negotiation, acceptance, and so on of its claims, models, experiments, and methods-cannot be captured through an exclusive focus on the static mathematical formulations of physical theories. Instead, we can more fruitfully think of physics, or arguably any science for that matter, as a set of practices, and more specifically, as a set of distinctively social, cognitive, and theoretical/methodological practices (Longino 1990).Understanding science as practices, rather than theories or data, is certainly not novel to this chapter or even philosophy of physics. An emphasis on practice has been one of the most notable aspects of the recent "naturalistic turn" in general philosophy of science, in no small part due to the arguments of many feminist philosophers of science. Theories and models are important, but their presentation and structure often obscures key aspects of their history, motivation, and importance. Moreover, many of the most interesting activities in science take place outside of the traditional categories of theory and evidence. A major project of feminist philosophy of physics has been to shine a critical light on the social and cognitive practices in physics, and how those ultimately influence other aspects of the science.

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On the observational equivalence of continuous-time deterministic and indeterministic descriptions

Cited by 24 publications

References 31 publications

Evidence for the Deterministic or the Indeterministic Description? A Critique of the Literature About Classical Dynamical Systems

Evidence for the Deterministic or the Indeterministic Description? A Critique of the Literature About Classical Dynamical Systems

Observational Equivalence of Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions and the Role of Different Observations

On the Possibility of Feminist Philosophy of Physics

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