On the Normativity of Human Nature: Some Epistemological Remarks

Abstract

This paper examines the role played by the concept of human nature in ethical theory. The focus is on the epistemological problems that arise from application of this notion to the foundation of ethics. From this viewpoint, two theories, the neoscholastic and the neoclassical ones, are expounded, analyzed and compared. The aim is to highlight their opposite ways of relating the "ought-to-be" (of norms) to the "is" (of human nature). The conclusion is drawn that an adequate solution of the dispute depends on a correct interpretation of Hume's law. Reflection is conducted in the last section on the implications of metaethical discourse on human nature for applied ethics.

Is it all about human nature? Ethical challenges of converging technologies beyond a polarized debate

“…an identification of the descriptive level (what an entity is) with the normative one (what an entity should be) (cf. also Corradini 2003). Further objections concern the risk of discrimination implicit in the normative use of the concept of human nature identified in its empirical terms: if a set of biological properties is taken as a standard of ''normality'', beings not having these properties can be discriminated against.…”

Theory, Science, Ideology and Ethics in Social Work

“…It is not only social work having this dialogue. Other professions such as business and medicine also acknowledge the interaction between science and morality, or in the words of Hume's Law between what 'is' and what 'ought to be' (Cowton 1998;Corradini 2003). Corradini argues that there is another interpretation of Hume's Law which suggests that it is not that there should be complete separation between science and ethics or empiricism and normativism, but that there needs to be appropriate rationalization for connecting the two.…”

El iusnaturalismo frente a la ley de Hume: El caso de la New Natural Law Theory y sus críticos.

“…De lo que se trataría, según la postura que ellos defienden, es de reconocer que los fundamentos desde los cuales es posible todo el despliegue argumental de la ética no son metafísicos, porque no tienen que ver con los hechos de la naturaleza sino con los principios de la razón práctica. Por ello, sin negar que la reflexión metafísica podría otorgar una visión de conjunto sobre la naturaleza humana, en la que se integra el orden práctico o moral, sería menester afirmar que es posible una visión parcial -que, en este caso, correspondería a la ética -que otorgaría explicaciones válidas y verdaderas sobre la dimensión moral de la vida de los hombres, y que esta visión parcial sería accesible sin aquella visión de conjunto: 8 Una síntesis de los elementos centrales de cada una de estas dos tesis se puede encontrar en Antonella Corradini (2003).…”