On the Normative Authority of Others

Shemmer, Yonatan

doi:10.1007/s11406-013-9490-x

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A Normative Theory Of Disagreement1

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2017

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“…He offers a different argument for the same conclusion in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings [1990: 180]. See also Shemmer [2014] for a criticism of that argument.) The view is also familiar from realist discussions of normative disagreement and more generally from discussions of nonnormative disagreement (Foley 2001: ch.…”

Section: A Normative Theory Of Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Normative Theory of Disagreement

Bex-Priestley¹,

Shemmer²

2017

J. of the Am. Philos. Assoc.

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ABSTRACT:Expressivists have trouble accounting for disagreement. If ethical or other normative judgments are desire-like rather than belief-like, it is puzzling why we think people often disagree in those domains. While previous expressivists have proposed only straightforwardly descriptive conditions under which disagreement occurs, we argue that disagreement itself should be understood normatively: two or more people disagree just in case their diverging attitudes imply, given a common project of theirs, that at least one of them has reason to change his or her mind.

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Section: A Normative Theory Of Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 99%