On the need for Embodied and Dis-Embodied Cognition

Abstract

This essay proposes and defends a pluralistic theory of conceptual embodiment. Our concepts are represented in at least two ways: (i) through sensorimotor simulations of our interactions with objects and events and (ii) through sensorimotor simulations of natural language processing. Linguistic representations are “dis-embodied” in the sense that they are dynamic and multimodal but, in contrast to other forms of embodied cognition, do not inherit semantic content from this embodiment. The capacity to store information in the associations and inferential relationships among linguistic representations extends our cognitive reach and provides an explanation of our ability to abstract and generalize. This theory is supported by a number of empirical considerations, including the large body of evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology supporting a multiple semantic code explanation of imageability effects.

Does comprehension of symbolic gestures and corresponding-in-meaning words make use of motor simulation?

“…Also, in keeping with the involvement of the motor system in processing action-related material, the results reported by Buccino et al [8] in a single pulse TMS study, have shown that motor evoked potentials (MEPs) recorded from hand muscles are modulated during listening to hand-related action sentences. Regarding abstract words, the issue is much more debated [9]. Scorolli et al [10] found M1 activation when TMS applied in an abstract verb condition was delayed (650 ms post-stimulus).…”

The amodal brain and the offloading hypothesis

“…In previous work, I have raised questions about the strength of the evidence for neo-empiricist theories of concepts (Machery, 2006(Machery, , 2007; see also Dove, 2009Dove, , 2011Mahon & Caramazza, 2008), and I have questioned whether these theories can really explain how concepts "implement important conceptual functions," in particular how thought can express "propositions" (Machery, 2014). In this article, I will challenge the claim that there is little evidence for amodal theories of concepts, arguing that in fact a growing body of evidence shows that concepts are amodal.…”

The contributions of language and experience to the representation of abstract and concrete words: Different weights but similar organizations

“…Again, these models agree on a general division of labor in the acquisition of these two types of concepts, with concrete concepts being largely learned through sensorimotor experience, and abstract concepts being largely learned through linguistic experience (Andrews et al, 2009;Crutch & Warrington, 2005;Dove, 2009Dove, , 2011Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2010;Steyvers, 2010). The behavioral data supporting this proposal, however, are still recent and limited.…”

“…Sensorimotor information . Free associationIn recent years, a diverse set of models regarding conceptual knowledge have proposed that multiple representational systems are engaged in conceptual processing (Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009;Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008;Dove, 2009Dove, , 2011Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008Simmons, Hamann, Harenski, Hu, & Barsalou, 2008;Steyvers, 2010). In particular, they have all considered that both more sensorimotor-based information and languagebased information play a role in conceptual representation, thus recapturing the ideas first proposed by Paivio (1971Paivio ( , 1986 in the context of the dual-code theory.…”

“…First, considering more recent proposals that multiple representational systems are engaged in conceptual processing (e.g., Andrews et al, 2009;Barsalou et al, 2008;Dove, 2009Dove, , 2011Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008Steyvers, 2010), we evaluated whether language information Fig. 4 Associates reflecting semantic similarity and semantic association for abstract and concrete concepts (Study 2) would be more important for the representation of abstract words, while experiential and sensorimotor information would be more important for concrete words.…”