On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions

Alchourrón, Carlos E.; Gärdenfors, Peter; Makinson, David

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_13

Cited by 255 publications

(548 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…More precisely, we present two new results that lie strictly "between" those of [1], viz., representation theorems for relational and negatively transitively relational partial meet contraction (still in §5). However, these results hold only under certain preconditions.…”

mentioning

confidence: 72%

“…In accordance with [1] as well as with the dominant approach in the theory of choice and preference, we shall focus on stringent maximization. 1 From now on, when we say that 7 is relational with respect to < over X, we mean that 7(5) = {y e S: y' < y for all y' e S} for every 5 e .1.…”

Section: Y(s)= {Yes:y'mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 From now on, when we say that 7 is relational with respect to < over X, we mean that 7(5) = {y e S: y' < y for all y' e S} for every 5 e .1. In this case we write 7 = 9\ <).…”

Section: Y(s)= {Yes:y'mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice

Rott

2016

Readings in Formal Epistemology

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Abstract. This paper reorganizes and further develops ihe theory of partial meet contraction which was introduced in a classic paper by Alchourron. Gardenfors. and Makinson. Our purpose is threefold. First, we put the theory in a broader perspective by decomposing it into two layers which can respectively be The basic idea of partial meet contraction is as follows. In order to eliminate a proposition x from a theory A while obeying the constraint of deductive closure and minimizing the loss of information, it is plausible to look at the maximal subsets B of A that fail to imply x. In an earlier paper, Alchourron and Makinson had proved that when A = Cn(A) taking one such B leaves an agent with too many propositions, while taking the intersection of all such B's leaves him with too few. In [1], AGM investigate the idea of taking the intersection of a select set of such B^s. The choice of which B's to take is made with the help of a selection function. A natural question is whether all these selections can be represented as the selections of preferred £Ts, where the preferences between maximally nonimplying subsets of A are independent of the proposition x to be deleted.

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mentioning

confidence: 72%

Section: Y(s)= {Yes:y'mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice

Rott

2016

Readings in Formal Epistemology

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“…Revision theory [3] is mainly about the evolution of an agent's belief when she learns that she was wrong about some proposition u. While such revisions naturally also modify the agent's goals, the belief revision literature basically never studied intention revision.…”

Section: Establish a Link With Revision Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

BDI Logics for BDI Architectures: Old Problems, New Perspectives

et al. 2016

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“…If E i 2 Ω \∅ then Conditions 1-4 in Definition 4.1 are necessary but not sufficient for the existence of such a plausibility relation. The existence of a plausibility relation that rationalizes the function f i (ω, ·) : E i → 2 Ω is necessary and sufficient for the belief revision policy encoded in f i (ω, ·) to be compatible with the theory of belief revision introduced in Alchourrón et al (1985), known as the AGM theory (see Bonanno (2009)). …”

Section: Rational Playmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning About Strategies and Rational Play in Dynamic Games

Bonanno

2015

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe discuss the issues that arise in modeling the notion of common belief of rationality in epistemic models of dynamic games, in particular at the level of interpretation of strategies. A strategy in a dynamic game is defined as a function that associates with every information set a choice at that information set. Implicit in this definition is a set of counterfactual statements concerning what a player would do at information sets that are not reached, or a belief revision policy concerning behavior at information sets that are ruled out by the initial beliefs. We discuss the role of both objective and subjective counterfactuals in attempting to flesh out the interpretation of strategies in epistemic models of dynamic games.

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On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions

Cited by 255 publications

References 4 publications

Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice

Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice

BDI Logics for BDI Architectures: Old Problems, New Perspectives

Reasoning About Strategies and Rational Play in Dynamic Games

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