On the legal responsibility of autonomous machines

Brożek, Bartosz; Jakubiec, Marek

doi:10.1007/s10506-017-9207-8

Cited by 46 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 24 publications

(20 reference statements)

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“…In support of this thesis we cite some authors that describe autonomous machine as "reactive (it responds in a timely fashion to changes in the environment), self-controlling (i.e. it exercises control over its own actions and is not directly controlled by any other agent), goal-oriented (it does not simply act in response to the environment), and temporally continuous (it is a continuously running process)" (Brożek, 2017). Thus, in theory it implies that degree of a person's culpability when artificial intelligence system is a tool of a crime may be affected by cognitive and volitional characteristics of AI.…”

Section: Culpability In Criminal Lawmentioning

confidence: 85%

The Concept of Culpability in Criminal Law and AI Systems

Дремлюга¹,

Prisekina²

2020

JPL

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This article focuses on the problems of the application of AI as a tool of crime from the perspective of the norms and principles of Criminal law. The article discusses the question of how the legal framework in the area of culpability determination could be applied to offenses committed with the use of AI. The article presents an analysis of the current state in the sphere of criminal law for both intentional and negligent offenses as well as a comparative analysis of these two forms of culpability. Part of the work is devoted to culpability in intentional crimes. Results of analysis in the paper demonstrate that the law-enforcer and the legislator should reconsider the approach to determining culpability in the case of the application of artificial intelligence systems for committing intentional crimes. As an artificial intelligence system, in some sense, has its own designed cognition and will, courts could not rely on the traditional concept of culpability in intentional crimes, where the intent is clearly determined in accordance with the actions of the criminal. Criminal negligence is reviewed in the article from the perspective of a developer’s criminal liability. The developer is considered as a person who may influence on and anticipate harm caused by AI system that he/she created. If product developers are free from any form of criminal liability for harm caused by their products, it would lead to highly negative social consequences. The situation when a person developing AI system has to take into consideration all potential harm caused by the product also has negative social consequences. The authors conclude that the balance between these two extremums should be found. The authors conclude that the current legal framework does not conform to the goal of a culpability determination for the crime where AI is a tool.

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Section: Culpability In Criminal Lawmentioning

confidence: 85%

The Concept of Culpability in Criminal Law and AI Systems

Дремлюга¹,

Prisekina²

2020

JPL

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“…However, certain commentators have argued that, even if it were possible to do so, legal rights should not be given to robots [35,63]. Brożek and Jakubiec have argued that legal responsibility should not be introduced to autonomous machines [64]. Authors have observed that any such law could only be "law in books" and could not be used in real life (i.e., could not be "law in action").…”

Section: A Ban On Public Violence Against Robotsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Should Violence Against Robots be Banned?

Mamak

2022

Int J of Soc Robotics

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This paper addresses the following question: “Should violence against robots be banned?” Such a question is usually associated with a query concerning the moral status of robots. If an entity has moral status, then concomitant responsibilities toward it arise. Despite the possibility of a positive answer to the title question on the grounds of the moral status of robots, legal changes are unlikely to occur in the short term. However, if the matter regards public violence rather than mere violence, the issue of the moral status of robots may be avoided, and legal changes could be made in the short term. Prohibition of public violence against robots focuses on public morality rather than on the moral status of robots. The wrongness of such acts is not connected with the intrinsic characteristics of robots but with their performance in public. This form of prohibition would be coherent with the existing legal system, which eliminates certain behaviors in public places through prohibitions against acts such as swearing, going naked, and drinking alcohol.

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“…73 Although such agents are "capable of multiple and autonomous intervention [sic] in the legal world," 74 such technology is very different from the androids we see in much science fiction 75 and, it is argued, means that current robots and AI should not be seen as legal agents. 76 The point is made by Bartosz Brozek and Marek Jacubiec, who introduce a character know as Mr Y. Mr Y is an android programmed to replicate human behavior, and the authors conclude he is undeserving of moral concern due to the fact he is nothing more than any other technology. 77 They argue that the mere replication of human behavior lacks an element of "folk-psychology"-an internalization by a population that the autonomous machine is one that is deserving of recognition as legally responsible based on characteristics the society deems relevant regarding beliefs, goals, intentions, and desires.…”

Section: Applying the Gewirthian Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings

Jowitt

2021

Camb Q Healthc Ethics

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The debate around whether novel beings should be legally recognized as legitimate rights holders is one that has produced a vast amount of commentary. This paper contributes to this discourse by shifting the normative focus of moral rights away from criteria possessed by the novel beings in question, and back toward the criterion upon which we ourselves are able to make legitimate rights claims. It draws heavily on the moral writing of Alan Gewirth’s identification of noumenal agency as the source of all legitimate rights claims. Taking Gewirthian ethical rationalism as providing a universally applicable hypothetical imperative which binds all agents to comply with its requirements, the paper argues that it is at least morally desirable that any legal system should recognize the moral rights claims of all agents as equally legitimate. By extension, it is at least morally desirable that the status of legal personhood should be granted by a legal system to all novel beings who are noumenal agents, insofar as this status is necessary for rights’ legal recognition. Having established the desirability of this extension, the paper closes with an examination of recent cases involving both biological and nonbiological novel beings in order to assess their conformity with the desirable approach outlined above. The paper demonstrates that such recognition is conceptually possible, thus requiring us to move beyond the current anthropocentricity of legal systems and recognize the legitimate moral claim for legal personhood for all novel beings who possess noumenal agency.

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On the legal responsibility of autonomous machines

Cited by 46 publications

References 24 publications

The Concept of Culpability in Criminal Law and AI Systems

The Concept of Culpability in Criminal Law and AI Systems

Should Violence Against Robots be Banned?

The Desirability of Legal Rights for Novel Beings

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