On the instability of the R&D portfolio in a dynamic monopoly. Or, one cannot get two eggs in one basket

Coordinating research and development efforts for quality improvement along a supply chain

“…; η = z 2 Θ 4 32bρ (δ + ρ) 2 (38) At this point it is quickly checked that q = q * , k q U = k q D = k * , x q = x * and π q U + π q D = π * . Accordingly, I may formulate…”

“…12 A plausible extension would consist in including learning-by-doing (for an exhaustive account of the related literature, see Thompson, 2010). This appears in Li and Ni (2016) and Lambertini et al (2017), where R&D with quality decay as in (2) accompanies knowledge accumulation. However, also in these models the driver of quality improvement is R&D, which is boosted (but cannot replaced) by learning effects accumulating according to an additional dynamics…”

Impact of Strategic Cooperation under Competition on Green Product Manufacturing

“…This study aims to address the gap by studying this effect of green investment decisions to produce development-intensive green products (DIGPs) and marginal-intensive green products (MIGPs). Investment decisions to improve quality have received considerable attention in the existing literature [14][15][16]. As reported by Dey et al [17], Zhou and He [18], green products can be classified into three categories: MIGPs, DIGPs, and MDIGPs (marginal and development-intensive green products).…”

Behavioral choices in a dynamic duopoly with process innovation and sticky price: Myopia versus farsightedness

“…Innovation is considered as one of the key criteria to evaluate any firm's sustainable development and competitiveness. Although a large number of classic articles on innovation are well documented in the existing literature, these studies assume that retail prices are always modeled by the inverse demand curve (e.g., Ayllon & Radicic, 2019; Cellini & Lambertini, 2009; Chenavaz, 2012; Lambertini & Orsini 2015; Lambertini, Orsini, & Palestini, 2017; Lin, 2004; Ni & Li, 2019; Pan & Li, 2016). To put it in another way, when the market environment changes, such as production cost, the retail price will respond perfectly to the change and immediately adjust to the level indicated by the reverse demand curve of a given market demand level.…”

“…Specifically, in this study, based on the work of Lambertini et al (2017), we introduce sticky prices, strategic interactions between the two players, and the myopic or farsighted behavior of the two players into a dynamic duopoly market. It is worth mentioning that, compared with the work of Lambertini et al (2017), our paper has at least two features: (i) in our model, the retail price cannot adjust immediately to the level implied by the inverse demand curve, which is dynamic changes, and (ii) each player has either myopic strategy or farsighted strategy. Based on the above analyses, our research questions are as follows: (i) What are the optimal strategies and behavioral preference of the two players in this dynamic duopoly market?…”