On the 'Innateness' of Religion: A Comment on Bering

Immortality of the Soul as an Intuitive Idea: Towards a Psychological Explanation of the Origins of Afterlife Beliefs

“…Since the I is implicitly conceived as independent on the body (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2003), the degree in which a mental state is perceived as body dependent could also determine if it would be attributed to the dead-I. his last prediction is also in accordance with the proposal of Pyysiäinen (2003).…”

“…For Bering (2002), this result indicates that subject's responses express an interaction between their culturally acquired AB and their intuitive notion of what might be the internal states of dead agents. Pyysiäinen (2003) criticizes the simulation constraint hypothesis, since there is no empirical evidence sustaining differences in the difficulty to imagine the absence of mental states. He claims that the absence and cessation of certain emotional and desire states is frequent, e.g., the experience of absence of the will to do something.…”

“…his author suggests that an alternative hypothesis to Bering's simulation constraint hypothesis might be the degree in which experiences are usually perceived as dependent on the body. Pyysiäinen (2003) proposes that while thinking about dead agents people focus on the types of experiences they could continue to have without a body.…”

“…Specifically, we intend to clarify if representations of the dead-I are determined by the simulation constraint proposed by Bering (2002), by an implicit theory about the degree of body dependence of various mental states (Pyysiäinen, 2003), and/or by the assumption of continuity of the I (or Subject-Self ) with the same characteristics that are associated to it in life (Sá-Nogueira Saraiva, 2003). he hypothesis of Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003) and Pyysiäinen (2003) are compatible, since both assume that the characteristics associated to the dead-I are those perceived as somehow independent on the body. he proposals of Bering (2002) and Sá-Nogueira Saraiva (2003) also have contact points, since both authors presume a cognitive constraint that prevents us from imagining the end of all types of experience.…”

Debates about Innate Religiosity in the Cognitive Science of Religion

“…См , он указывает лишь на врожден-ность некоторых когнитивных структур, естественным, но тем не менее побочным продуктом которых религия выступает. Как отмечает финский религиовед И. Пюсиайнен, критикуя пози-цию приверженцев ТоПВ (здесь стоит вспомнить подход к интер-претации понятия «религия» в КР), «некоторые понятия и спо-собы мышления могут быть врожденными, но религия может быть не более врожденной, чем футбол или политика» 91 . Кроме того, сомнения высказываются и в адрес не только врожденно-сти и универсальности структур, лежащих, с точки зрения сторон-ников ТоПВ, в основе религиозных представлений -например, модели психического, интуитивного эссенциализма и дуализ-ма 92 , -но и концепций узкой специализации психики и всеоб-щей модульности 93 .…”