On the independence of belief and credence

Jackson, Elizabeth

doi:10.1111/phis.12225

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The focal point of this reasoning is the insight that Low Stakes and High Stakes 37 For an overview of the literature on the relationship between flat-out and graded doxastic attitudes see Jackson (2020b). The above-mentioned trend is summarised in Jackson (2022). 38 For the most part, scholars do not even refer to the substantive, reasons-responsiveness conception of rationality when discussing credences.…”

Section: Reasons In Favour Of Graded Inquisitive Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against zetetic encroachment

Vollmer

2024

Synthese

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Proponents of zetetic encroachment claim that certain zetetic or inquiry-related considerations can have a bearing on the epistemic rationality of one’s belief formation. Since facts about the interestingness or importance of a topic can be the right kind of reasons for inquisitive attitudes, such as curiosity, and inquisitive attitudes are ways to suspend judgement, these facts also amount to reasons against believing. This mechanism is said to explain several contentious phenomena in epistemology, such as the occurrence of pragmatic encroachment. In this paper, I provide two lines of reasoning against zetetic encroachment. First, on any contrastivist understanding of epistemic reasons, the case in favour of zetetic encroachment loses all its motivational force. Second, the thesis of zetetic encroachment is incompatible with the most promising way to understand degrees of inquisitive attitudes.

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Section: Reasons In Favour Of Graded Inquisitive Attitudesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against zetetic encroachment

Vollmer

2024

Synthese

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“…55 55 Jackson (2020) calls this view “strong dualism” about the descriptive relationship between belief and credence. See Jackson (2022) for discussion of various contemporary views that posit a significant degree of descriptive and normative independence between belief and credence. …”

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Kierkegaard on belief and credence

Quanbeck

2023

European J of Philosophy

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Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus famously defines faith as a risky “venture” that requires “holding fast” to “objective uncertainty.” Yet puzzlingly, he emphasizes that faith requires resolute conviction and certainty. Moreover, Climacus claims that all beliefs about contingent propositions about the external world “exclude doubt” and “nullify uncertainty,” but also that uncertainty is “continually present” in these very same beliefs. This paper argues that these apparent contradictions can be resolved by interpreting Climacus as a belief‐credence dualist. That is, Climacus holds that beliefs and credences (i.e., degrees of belief) are two irreducibly distinct types of mental states. Beliefs are resolutions that close inquiry, thereby excluding doubt and reflecting subjective certainty by disregarding the possibility of error. Credences, by contrast, reflect assessments of evidential probabilities, thereby encoding a recognition of “objective uncertainty” by acknowledging the possibility of error. In addition to solving a vexing interpretive puzzle and showing how Kierkegaard anticipates contemporary views about the nature of belief and credence, this paper demonstrates that Kierkegaard developed a sophisticated account of the nature of belief, doubt, and certainty that merits serious philosophical consideration.

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On the Nature (and Irrationality) of Non-religious Faith

Gaultier

2024

Erkenn

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My main aim in this paper is to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of non-religious faith. I start by summarising several well-known arguments that belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for faith. I then try to identify the nature of the positive cognitive attitude towards p that is involved in having faith that p. After dismissing some candidates for the role, I explore the idea that faith and hope are similar attitudes. On this basis, I then advance a new characterisation of faith. Finally, I turn to the question of the rationality of faith. I argue that faith is intrinsically irrational because it is an intrinsically incoherent propositional attitude, but that there is nonetheless a sense in which faith is neither intrinsically epistemically irrational nor intrinsically practically irrational.

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On the independence of belief and credence

Cited by 4 publications

References 113 publications

Against zetetic encroachment

Against zetetic encroachment

Kierkegaard on belief and credence

On the Nature (and Irrationality) of Non-religious Faith

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