On the (In)Stability of Nonlinear Feedback Solutions in a Dynamic Duopoly with Renewable Resource Exploitation

Lambertini, Luca; Mantovani, Andrea

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2730581

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 13 publications

(9 reference statements)

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“…) 2 > 0 indicate that the marginal cost of abatement investment is rising. Following Lambertini and Mantovani [39] and Guiomar et al [40], assume that both regions are damaged by the stock of pollution, and we assume that there exists the following pollution damage function:…”

Section: The Necessary Assumptions and Establishment Of The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

et al. 2021

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This paper studies a Stackelberg differential game between an upstream region and a downstream region for transboundary pollution control and ecological compensation in a river basin and increases the number of pollutants assumed in the model to multiple. Emission and green innovation investment between upstream and downstream regions in the same basin is a Stackelberg game, and the downstream region provides economic compensation for green innovation investment in the upstream region. The results show that there is an optimal ecological compensation rate, and a Pareto improvement result can be obtained by implementing ecological compensation. Increasing the proportion of ecological compensation can improve the nonvirtuous chain reaction between green innovation investment cost, pollutant transfer rate, and ecological compensation rate. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a joint mechanism composed of the government and the market and formulate a reasonable green innovation subsidy scheme according to the actual situation of the basin, so as to restrict the emergence of this “individual rational” behavior. For river basin areas that can establish a unified management department and organize the implementation of decision-making, the cooperative game is a very effective pollution control decision.

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Section: The Necessary Assumptions and Establishment Of The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

et al. 2021

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“…The present game produces infinitely many nonlinear feedback solutions whose continuum can be fully characterised using the same procedure as in Lambertini (2016a) and Lambertini and Mantovani (2016), which in turn relies on Rowat's (2007). 6 Without replicating the entire analysis of the nonlinear case, here it suffices to characterise the degenerate nonlinear solution identified by the tangency between the highest isocline of the representative firm and the locus…”

Section: Nonlinear Feedback Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating the tragedy of commons: Nonlinear feedback solutions of a differential game with a dual interpretation

Lambertini

2021

Energy Economics

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A well established dynamic model describing the impact of oligopolistic interaction on a renewable resource is revisited here to illustrate its dual interpretation as a waste removal differential game. The regulatory implications are illustrated by assuming that the public agency may control market price and possibly also access to the commons. Two different formulations of the managerial or CSR objective are envisaged, based on a combination of profits and either output or the individual share of the waste stock. It is shown that if the representative firm's objective includes the residual waste stock, there exists a unique regulated price driving to zero the steady state stock itself.Hence, the present analysis delivers some useful indications concerning an appropriate definition of the CSR objective firms should adopt.

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On the (In)Stability of Nonlinear Feedback Solutions in a Dynamic Duopoly with Renewable Resource Exploitation

Cited by 2 publications

References 13 publications

Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

Dynamic Optimal Control Differential Game of Ecological Compensation for Multipollutant Transboundary Pollution

Regulating the tragedy of commons: Nonlinear feedback solutions of a differential game with a dual interpretation

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