On the Importance of Uniform Sharing Rules for Efficient Matching

Dizdar, Deniz; Moldovanu, Benny

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2622664

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Chakraborty et al (2010) show that stable mechanisms do not usually exist. Dizdar and Moldovanu (2013) establish that (under transferrable utility) only fixed-proportion sharing rules are compatible with efficiency.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 88%

Stability with one-sided incomplete information

Bikhchandani

2017

Journal of Economic Theory

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Two notions of stability, ex ante stability and Bayesian stability, are investigated in a matching model with non-transferrable utility, interdependent preferences, and one-sided incomplete information. Ex ante stable matching-outcomes are unblocked for every belief on the blocking partner's type while Bayesian stable matching-outcomes are unblocked with respect to prior beliefs. Ex ante stability is a minimal requirement. Bayesian stability is a more selective desideratum with sound efficiency properties.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 88%

Stability with one-sided incomplete information

Bikhchandani

2017

Journal of Economic Theory

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“…Hoppe, Moldovanu, and Sela (2009) show that assortative matching can arise in a Bayesian equilibrium of a bilateral (costly) signaling game. Dizdar and Moldovanu (2016) study a model where agents are characterized by private, multi-dimensional attributes which jointly determine the surplus from a match and give a possible explanation for the prevalence of rules that divide surplus in a fixed proportion. Matching in all of these articles is static.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Matching auctions

Fershtman

Pavan²

2022

The RAND J of Economics

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We study platform markets in which agents arrive gradually, experience changes to their preferences over time, and are frequently re‐matched. We introduce simple auctions specifically designed for such markets. Upon joining, agents select a status that determines the weight assigned to their future bids. Each match is then assigned a score that depends on the agents' reciprocal bids and status. The matches maximizing the sum of the bilateral scores are implemented. Under certain conditions, such auctions maximize profits, welfare, or a combination of the two. We use the results to shed light on the distortions due to platforms' market power.

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“…Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2006) for the voting in the deliverative jury problem and Che, Kim, and Kojima (2015) for a house allocation problem without transfers, for instance. Dizdar and Moldovanu (2016) studied a two-sided matching model with a …nite number of agents, two-sided incomplete information, interdependent values, and multi-dimensional attributes and show that premuneration values corresponding to uniform, …xed-proportion sharing are essentially the only e¢ cient ones in their setting. A recent work by Pourpouneh, Ramezanianz, and Sen (2018) show the existence of ex post incentive compatible and ex-post stable rules in the marriage problem with speci…c interdependent preferences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%