Abstract:Incorporating carbon offsets in the design of cap-and-trade programs remains a controversial issue because of its potential unintended impacts on emissions. At the heart of this discussion is the issue of crediting of emissions reductions. Projects can be correctly, over-or under-credited for their actual emissions reductions. We develop a unified framework that considers the supply of offsets within a cap-and-trade program that allows us to compare the relative impact of over-credited offsets and under-credit… Show more
“…While the precision and uncertainty in our alternative estimate of common practice varies according to the rarity of forest types and prevalence of FIA data, the fact that our analysis accounts for variance in estimated carbon stocks across both species and space makes it more accurate and ecologically robust than the approach used in California's program. Invoking the use of FIA data to assure the quality of a forest offsets program is not enough; a reliable protocol must also show how sampling density and statistical uncertainty are managed through rigorous protocol design (7).…”
Section: Data Limitationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We then filtered the FIA data to meet the following criteria: (i) classified as accessible forestland (COND_STATUS_CD == 1); (ii) that were measured between 2001 and 2015; and (iii) fell on privately owned land. Using publicly reported (e.g., fuzzed and swapped) plot latitude and longitude, we assigned each condition a mean temperature and mean precipitation based on 30-year climate normals from PRISM (7). PRISM data were first regridded to a 4km Albers Equal Area Projection using area weighted resampling.…”
Section: Spatial Arbitrage Patternsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Offsets are also controversial. Because compliance offsets enable higher emissions within legally binding policy regimes, they must reflect "additional" climate benefits that go beyond what is expected under counterfactual business-as-usual conditions (7). Compliance offsets' additionality is therefore a fundamental prerequisite to their successful inclusion in climate policy, but this standard is not always achieved in practice.…”
Carbon offsets are widely used by individuals, corporations, and governments to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions on the assumption that offsets reflect equivalent climate benefits achieved elsewhere. These climate-equivalence claims depend on offsets providing "additional" climate benefits beyond what would have happened, counterfactually, without the offsets project. Here, we evaluate the design of California's prominent forest carbon offsets program and demonstrate that its climate-equivalence claims fall far short on the basis of directly observable evidence. By design, California's program awards large volumes of offset credits to forest projects with carbon stocks that exceed regional averages. This paradigm allows for adverse selection, which could occur if project developers preferentially select forests that are ecologically distinct from unrepresentative regional averages. By digitizing and analyzing comprehensive offset project records alongside detailed forest inventory data, we provide direct evidence that comparing projects against coarse regional carbon averages has led to systematic over-crediting of 30.0 million tCO2e (90% CI: 20.5 to 38.6 million tCO2e) or 29.4% of the credits we analyzed (90% CI: 20.1 to 37.8%). These excess credits are worth an estimated $410 million (90% CI: $280 to $528 million) at recent market prices. Rather than improve forest management to store additional carbon, California's offsets program creates incentives to generate offset credits that do not reflect real climate benefits.
“…While the precision and uncertainty in our alternative estimate of common practice varies according to the rarity of forest types and prevalence of FIA data, the fact that our analysis accounts for variance in estimated carbon stocks across both species and space makes it more accurate and ecologically robust than the approach used in California's program. Invoking the use of FIA data to assure the quality of a forest offsets program is not enough; a reliable protocol must also show how sampling density and statistical uncertainty are managed through rigorous protocol design (7).…”
Section: Data Limitationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We then filtered the FIA data to meet the following criteria: (i) classified as accessible forestland (COND_STATUS_CD == 1); (ii) that were measured between 2001 and 2015; and (iii) fell on privately owned land. Using publicly reported (e.g., fuzzed and swapped) plot latitude and longitude, we assigned each condition a mean temperature and mean precipitation based on 30-year climate normals from PRISM (7). PRISM data were first regridded to a 4km Albers Equal Area Projection using area weighted resampling.…”
Section: Spatial Arbitrage Patternsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Offsets are also controversial. Because compliance offsets enable higher emissions within legally binding policy regimes, they must reflect "additional" climate benefits that go beyond what is expected under counterfactual business-as-usual conditions (7). Compliance offsets' additionality is therefore a fundamental prerequisite to their successful inclusion in climate policy, but this standard is not always achieved in practice.…”
Carbon offsets are widely used by individuals, corporations, and governments to mitigate their greenhouse gas emissions on the assumption that offsets reflect equivalent climate benefits achieved elsewhere. These climate-equivalence claims depend on offsets providing "additional" climate benefits beyond what would have happened, counterfactually, without the offsets project. Here, we evaluate the design of California's prominent forest carbon offsets program and demonstrate that its climate-equivalence claims fall far short on the basis of directly observable evidence. By design, California's program awards large volumes of offset credits to forest projects with carbon stocks that exceed regional averages. This paradigm allows for adverse selection, which could occur if project developers preferentially select forests that are ecologically distinct from unrepresentative regional averages. By digitizing and analyzing comprehensive offset project records alongside detailed forest inventory data, we provide direct evidence that comparing projects against coarse regional carbon averages has led to systematic over-crediting of 30.0 million tCO2e (90% CI: 20.5 to 38.6 million tCO2e) or 29.4% of the credits we analyzed (90% CI: 20.1 to 37.8%). These excess credits are worth an estimated $410 million (90% CI: $280 to $528 million) at recent market prices. Rather than improve forest management to store additional carbon, California's offsets program creates incentives to generate offset credits that do not reflect real climate benefits.
“…At the program level, some projects may be under-credited because of strict project discounting (described below), and others may be over-credited by having non-additional credits. But with all projects evaluated by the same standards, the overall program should achieve program-level additionality (Bento et al 2016).…”
Section: Do Forest Offsets Benefit Climate-change Mitigation?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These data increase confidence in the program's climate benefits and additionality of emissions reductions. Forest offset projects in other jurisdictions have struggled to establish similarly reliable and standardized baselines (Bento et al 2016), and the California program has benefited greatly from having long-established regional baseline data. To address this challenge in programs outside of the US, we recommend considering different levels of discounting for uncertainty; offset programs that use data from sources with higher uncertainty could discount a greater portion of their credits.…”
Are forest offsets an effective way to address climate change, and do they provide other benefits? In some climate‐change mitigation policies, industries and individuals can purchase offsets that compensate for their greenhouse‐gas emissions by reducing emissions elsewhere. However, offsets may undermine mitigation efforts, by potentially giving carbon credits for emissions reductions that would have occurred even without the offset program in place. We evaluate California's forest offset program – the first‐ever legally enforceable “compliance” offset program for existing forests – to determine whether offsets (1) provide additional emissions reductions that would not have occurred without the program (called “additionality”) and (2) yield other benefits. We found that California's forest offset program, comprising a small portion of the state's mitigation portfolio, does not inhibit overall emissions reductions. Further, the program advances stringent “additionality” of emissions reductions through multiple mechanisms. Finally, mitigation through forest offsets can yield a suite of important co‐benefits. Lessons from California's experience with forest offsets can help to inform other offset programs that are increasingly being developed around the world.
The Paris Agreement will greatly benefit from the past experience with international market mechanisms for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions and related regulatory systems, which have gone through four periods with specific challenges. The first period 1997–2004 operationalized the mechanisms defined in the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). Pilot activities in different sectors were undertaken by the public sector, and the first baseline and monitoring methodologies officially approved. Between 2005 and 2011, the carbon markets expanded massively. The EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS) was linked to the Kyoto mechanisms, creating demand for carbon credits from the private sector. During this “gold rush” period criticism emerged with regarding the uneven geographical distribution of projects, as well as environmental integrity problems related to baselines and additionality. The next period saw a collapse in carbon prices between 2012 and 2014, limiting the development of new projects. The quantitative limits on the use of offsets in the EU ETS were reached and the failure to agree on a new international regime resulted in a drying up of demand from governments. The 2015–2018 period is characterized by a gradual stabilization of the international climate regime. The Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 increases complexity through global participation in mitigation. Future carbon markets will therefore face both old challenges—supply–demand balance, environmental integrity, transaction costs—and new ones—interactions with other policies and national targets, and sectoral/policy baselines and additionality checks preventing hot air proliferation.
This article is categorized under:
The Carbon Economy and Climate Mitigation > Policies, Instruments, Lifestyles, Behavior
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