On the human uniqueness of the temporal reasoning system

Montemayor, Carlos

doi:10.1017/s0140525x19000335

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 43 publications

(54 reference statements)

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“…This does not require a specific positive account of representation, but does require more than some prominent attempts at naturalizing representation, such as simple covariation theories and at least some versions of teleosemantics. For example, Montemayor (2013) argues on the basis of a broadly teleosemantic account, and Gallistel (1990) argues on a functioning isomorphism view, that temporal representation is implied by many of the cases that Hoerl and McCormack think merely show sensitivity (cf., Montemayor, 2019; Pan & Carruthers, 2019; Viera & Margolis, 2019).…”

Section: Upshots Of the Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation

Brown

2022

Mind & Language

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Recent influential accounts of temporal representation—the use of mental representations with explicit temporal contents, such as before and after relations and durations—sharply distinguish representation from mere sensitivity. A common, important picture of inter‐temporal rationality is that it consists in maximizing total expected discounted utility across time. By analyzing reinforcement learning algorithms, this article shows that, given such notions of temporal representation and inter‐temporal rationality, it would be possible for an agent to achieve inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation. It then explores potential upshots of this result for theorizing about rationality and representation.

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Section: Upshots Of the Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation

Brown

2022

Mind & Language

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“…First, the conscious perspective of a human does not seem to be sufficiently captured by a set of capacities formatted in diverse ways because language, introspective and overt, plays a fundamental role in the consolidation of such a reflective perspective. Second, the kind of memory required for the richly autobiographical conscious perspective of a typical human being cannot be captured by a navigational and “moment-to-moment” perspective (for discussion see Hoerl and McCormack, 2018 ; Montemayor, 2019c ). Thus, the main focus of this section is “the self ” (understood in terms of the first person perspective), as a source of unity in cognition for both consciousness and attention.…”

Section: A Diversity Of Perspectives and The Unity Of The Selfmentioning

confidence: 99%

Types of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem

Montemayor

2021

Front. Syst. Neurosci.

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Consciousness research has a cognitive-diversity problem. Any view that holds that attention is either necessary for consciousness or that attention precedes conscious awareness confronts the difficulty that the theoretical categorization of attention is as diverse as the categorization of intelligent cognition, but consciousness is typically referred to as a single and unified capacity. On the one hand, we have a multiplicity of kinds of attention. On the other hand, we use a monolithic “phenomenal” notion of consciousness to define the dependency of consciousness on all these diverse kinds of attention. Since attention is defined in terms of a diverse variety of functions, a lot more needs to be said with respect to the claim that attention is either necessary for consciousness or that attentional processing precedes conscious awareness. Is this dependency based on the diverse cognitive functions of attention? If so, why conceive of consciousness as a single informationally unified cognitive capacity? What does the multiplicity of kinds of attention entail for consciousness research? This is the “diversity problem.” This article argues that consciousness should be also considered as a diverse set of capacities, based on the diversity of attention. While we have the intuition that consciousness is a unified perspective, the article shows that consistency demands this diverse approach. Since research on attention distinguishes a wide range of functions and levels of cognitive processing, the dependency of consciousness on attention entails diverse conscious capacities and diverse types of awareness beyond the distinctions between being awake, dreaming, and being minimally conscious.

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Mental time travel in animals: the ‘when’ of mental time travel

Latham,

Miller,

Pedersen

2024

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

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While many aspects of cognition have been shown to be shared between humans and non-human animals, there remains controversy regarding whether the capacity to mentally time travel is a uniquely human one. In this paper, we argue that there are four ways of representing when some event happened: four kinds of temporal representation . Distinguishing these four kinds of temporal representation has five benefits. First, it puts us in a position to determine the particular benefits these distinct temporal representations afford an organism. Second, it provides the conceptual resources to foster a discussion about which of these representations is necessary for an organism to count as having the capacity to mentally time travel. Third, it enables us to distinguish stricter from more liberal views of mental time travel that differ regarding which kind(s) of temporal representation is taken to be necessary for mental time travel. Fourth, it allows us to determine the benefits of taking a stricter or more liberal view of mental time travel. Finally, it ensures that disagreement about whether some species can mentally time travel is not merely the product of unrecognized disagreement about which temporal representation is necessary for mental time travel. We argue for a more liberal view, on the grounds that it allows us to view mental time travel as an evolutionarily continuous phenomenon and to recognize that differences in the ways that organisms mentally time travel might reflect different temporal representations, or combinations thereof, that they employ. Our ultimate aim, however, is to create a conceptual framework for further discussion regarding what sorts of temporal representations are required for mental time travel. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research’.

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On the human uniqueness of the temporal reasoning system

Cited by 3 publications

References 43 publications

Inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation

Inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation

Types of Consciousness: The Diversity Problem

Mental time travel in animals: the ‘when’ of mental time travel

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