On the general acceptance of confessions research: Opinions of the scientific community.

Abstract

Eighty-seven experts on the psychology of confessions-many of whom were highly published, many with courtroom experience-were surveyed online about their opinions on 30 propositions of relevance to deception detection, police interrogations, confessions, and relevant general principles of psychology. As indicated by an agreement rate of at least 80%, there was a strong consensus that several findings are sufficiently reliable to present in court. This list includes but is not limited to the proposition that the risk of false confessions is increased not only by explicit threats and promises but by 2 common interrogation tactics-namely, the false evidence ploy and minimization tactics that imply leniency by offering sympathy and moral justification. Experts also strongly agreed that the risk of undue influence is higher among adolescents, individuals with compliant or suggestible personalities, and those with intellectual impairments or diagnosed psychological disorders. Additional findings indicated that experts set a high standard before judging a proposition to be sufficiently reliable for court-and an even higher standard on the question "Would you testify?" Regarding their role as scientific experts, virtually all respondents stated that their primary objective was to educate the jury and that juries are more competent at evaluating confession evidence with assistance from an expert than without. These results should assist trial courts and expert witnesses in determining what aspects of the science are generally accepted and suitable for presentation in court. (PsycINFO Database Record

A test of the micro‐expressions training tool: Does it improve lie detection?

“…2). The idea that micro-expression recognition improves lie detection has also been put forth in the scientific literature (Ekman, 2009;Ekman & Matsumoto, 2011;Kassin, Redlich, Alceste, & Luke, 2018) and promoted in the wider culture. One example of this is its use as a focal plot device in the crime drama television series Lie to Me, which ran for three seasons (Baum, 2009).…”

The Return of the Repressed: The Persistent and Problematic Claims of Long-Forgotten Trauma

“…For example, in a Dutch revision case in which dissociative memories of abuse were the central issue, one senior prosecutor opined that in contrast to DNA experts, psychological experts do not aid judges in helping them to understand the intricacies of statements by witnesses or defendants (https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:PHR:2015:2769). He added that the field of legal psychology is known for its lack of consensus and for its high degree of subjectivity, which is hyperbolic when one looks at the generally broad consensus on a range of topics found in surveys among legal psychologists (Kassin, Redlich, Alceste, & Luke, 2018; Kassin et al, 2001). Furthermore, research clearly indicates that judges routinely overestimate jurors’ ability to understand and correctly use memory evidence when in fact it is based solely on their “common sense”—such as that memory works like a video camera (e.g., Houston, Hope, Memon, & Read, 2013; Magnussen et al, 2010); for the Scooter Libby effect, see also Kassam, Gilbert, Swencionis, & Wilson, 2009).…”

Forging Diversity‐Science‐Informed Guidelines for Research on Race and Racism in Psychological Science

“…More recent examples of the importance of evidence‐based policy abound, including the discovery that many common‐sense police practices increase the risk of false confessions and disproportionately affect criminal suspects of color (e.g., American Psychological Association, ; Kassin et al., ; Kassin, Redlich, Alceste, & Luke, ); the awareness of the prevalence and consequences of implicit racial biases in individual and institutional discrimination, in direct contradiction to the ruling in Washington v. Davis (; e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, ; Jost et al., ; Kovera, ); and the discovery that police department policies promoting the use of Terry stops (i.e., stop‐and‐frisks; Terry v. Ohio) both fail to identify more crime and disproportionately harm communities of color (e.g., Hester & Gray, ; Jones‐Brown, Stoudt, Johnston, & Moran, ; Saunders, Kelly, Cohen, & Guarino, ; Sewell, Jefferson, & Lee, ).…”