On the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study

Galizzi, Matteo M.; Navarro-Martínez, Daniel

doi:10.1287/mnsc.2017.2908

Cited by 175 publications

(153 citation statements)

References 156 publications

(70 reference statements)

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“…Future work could usefully examine the development of moral phenotypes at the motivational (rather than behavioral) level, for example by exposing the same group of participants to different social decision tasks separated by long time intervals (in the order of months) and measuring cross-task predictive power. Such work should take existing data on the mismatch between laboratory task decisions and real-world moral behavior into account 33 . Follow-up work could also consider testing explicitly for other motives such as reciprocity motives (Falk et al, 2003).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stationary distribution of moral strategies in a population

Baar¹,

Klaassen²,

Ricci³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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ORCIDs 0000-0001-8567-7931 (J.v.B.) 0000-0002-6621-8120 (L.C.) AbstractEvolutionary models show that human cooperation can arise through direct reciprocity relationships.However, it remains largely unclear which psychological mechanisms may proximally motivate an individual to reciprocate. Recent evidence demonstrates that psychological motives for reciprocal choices (i.e., moral strategies) differ between individuals, which raises the question whether these differences have a stationary distribution in a population or are rather an artifact of the experimental task. Here, we combine data from three independent studies and participant samples to find that the relative prevalence of different moral strategies is highly stable across these datasets. Furthermore, the distribution of moral strategies is relatively unaffected by changes to the salient features of the experimental paradigm. Finally, the moral strategy classification assigned by our computational modeling analysis corresponds to the participants' own subjective experience of their psychological decision process, and no existing models of social preference can account for the observed individual differences in moral strategies. This research supports the view that social decision-making is not just regulated by individual differences in 'pro-social' versus 'pro-self' tendencies, but also by trait-like differences across several alternative pro-social motives, whose distribution in a population is stationary.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stationary distribution of moral strategies in a population

Baar¹,

Klaassen²,

Ricci³

et al. 2020

Preprint

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“…If these scales do not correlate with such an important indicator of life-history strategy, it raises questions about the validity of these scales. Third, cooperation in economic games has recently been criticized for bearing no relationship with actual behavior (Galizzi & Navarro-Martinez, 2019). Extending on these previous studies, the present study aims to overcome these limitations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 94%

Environmental harshness is associated with lower investment in collective actions

Lettinga

Jacquet

André

et al. 2019

Preprint

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Although humans cooperate universally, there is variability across individuals, times and cultures in the amount of resources people invest in cooperative activities. The origins of such variability are not known but recent work highlights that variations in environmental harshness may play a key role. A growing body of experimental work in evolutionary psychology suggests that humans adapt to their specific environment by calibrating their lifehistory strategy. In this paper, we apply structural equation models to test the association between current and childhood environmental harshness, life-history strategy and adult cooperation in two large-scale datasets (the World Values Survey and the European Values Study). The present study replicates existing research linking a harsher environment (both in adulthood and in childhood) with a modulated reproduction-maintenance trade-off and extends these findings to the domain of collective actions. Specifically, we find that a harsher environment (both in adulthood and in childhood) is associated with decreased involvement in collective action and that this association is mediated by individuals' life-history strategy.

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“…The viability of predicting behavior in laboratory social dilemmas from behavior on other laboratory tasks has not been well established, despite a number of investigations (Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud 2006;Binmore and Shaked 2010;Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann 2011;Camerer 2011;Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez 2019;Kingsley and Liu 2014). If such a link cannot be established, claims that results in the laboratory can inform us about behavior in decision contexts outside the laboratory where the stakes, framing, and incentives all differ are premature.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is particularly true when comparing prosocial behavior in laboratory tasks to behavior in the real world. Some studies find significant correlations (Camerer 2011;Dai, Galeotti, and Villeval 2016;Karlan 2005; Normann, Requate, and Waichman 2014), but others report remarkably robust null effects across a wide range of tasks and measures (Carpenter and Seki 2011;Galizzi and Navarro-Martinez 2019;Stoop, Noussair, and van Soest 2012). In many studies that do report a significant relationship, the correlation is often noticeably smaller than test-retest correlations when an individual completes the same task multiple times.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in Public Goods Games Predicts Behavior in Incentive‐matched Binary Dilemmas: Evidence for Stable Prosociality

2019

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We report the results of an experiment in which subjects completed second mover public goods game tasks and second mover binary social dilemma tasks. Each task was completed under three different incentive structures which were matched across tasks. The use of nonlinear incentive structures, along with a novel categorization method, allowed us to identify behavioral subtypes that cannot be distinguished using conventional linear incentive structures. We also examined how well behavior could be predicted across tasks. Subjects' average conditional cooperation levels showed significant cross‐task predictability and stability. However, almost a third of responses (28%) demonstrated unambiguous preference reversals across tasks. We argue that prosociality is best described as an individual‐level trait, similar to risk aversion in choice under risk. (JEL C7, C91, H41)

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On the External Validity of Social Preference Games: A Systematic Lab-Field Study

Cited by 175 publications

References 156 publications

Stationary distribution of moral strategies in a population

Stationary distribution of moral strategies in a population

Environmental harshness is associated with lower investment in collective actions

Cooperation in Public Goods Games Predicts Behavior in Incentive‐matched Binary Dilemmas: Evidence for Stable Prosociality

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