On the evasion of employment protection legislation

Baumann, Florian; Friehe, Tim

doi:10.1016/j.labeco.2011.06.005

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…4) Moving beyond the economic analysis of courts and litigation, our contribution is related to the political economy of employment protection legislation (e. g., Saint-Paul (2002), Bruegemann (2007), Neugart (2008), Boeri et al (2012)). The evasion of dismissal protection regulations has been investigated theoretically by Martin et al (2004) and Baumann and Friehe (2012) and in empirical studies by Almeida and Carneiro (2009) among others. Additionally, the role of courts in the enforcement of employment protection legislation has been looked at by Ichino et al (2003), Galdón-Sánchez and Güell (2003), Stähler (2008), Huang et al (2009), Goerke and Pannenberg (2010), Fraisse (2010), and Berger and Neugart (2012), inter alia.…”

Section: Previous Analysesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying and dismissal dispute resolution systems

Goerke

Neugart

2015

International Review of Law and Economics

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Section: Previous Analysesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying and dismissal dispute resolution systems

Goerke

Neugart

2015

International Review of Law and Economics

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“…Studies on illegal reductions in corporate costs include Danziger (2010) and Basu et al (2010), who examine minimum wage violations, and Baumann and Friehe (2012), who investigate non-compliance with employment protection legislation. In the realm of environmental economics, a rich literature on law violations focusing on the imperfect enforcement of pollution or technology standards has developed, ranging from Harford (1978) to contributions as recent as Arguedas (2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competitive Pressure and Corporate Crime

Baumann

Friehe

2015

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may September 2013Abstract This paper explores the relationship between the intensity of competition in product markets and firms' incentives to lower their production costs by illegal means. Our framework combines a Salop circle with a crime modelà la Becker, allowing us to differentiate between several measures for the intensity of competition. We establish that more firms in the industry (i.e., lower entry costs) reduce the crime rate. Furthermore, whether more intense competition due to the increased substitutability of products raises or lowers the prevalence of criminal behavior can be clearly linked to the impact of such behavior on firms' production costs. Finally, we find that stricter law enforcement may entice more firms to enter the market, despite the higher expected sanction in the event of wrongdoing.

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Design standards and technology adoption: welfare effects of increasing environmental fines when the number of firms is endogenous

Baumann¹,

Friehe

2016

Environ Econ Policy Stud

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Terms of use: Documents in Design Standards and Technology Adoption: Welfare Effects of Increasing Environmental Fines when the Number of Firms is EndogenousFlorian Baumann * Tim Friehe † September 2013Abstract This paper examines the consequences of an increase in the expected fine for non-compliance with an environmental design standard for an industry with Cournot competition and free entry. Our analysis is quite timely, given recent policy proposals to raise environmental fines. We describe the range in which changes in the environmental fine have no consequences, and detail the various other effects that emerge. It is established that an increase in the expected fine for non-compliance may have adverse welfare consequences, while it always serves the purpose of inducing a greater share of firms to adopt the prescribed technology.

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On the evasion of employment protection legislation

Cited by 3 publications

References 33 publications

Lobbying and dismissal dispute resolution systems

Lobbying and dismissal dispute resolution systems

Competitive Pressure and Corporate Crime

Design standards and technology adoption: welfare effects of increasing environmental fines when the number of firms is endogenous

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