On the Ethics of Deception in Negotiation

Strudler, Alan

doi:10.5840/10.2307/3857416

Cited by 20 publications

(29 citation statements)

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“…Moreover, the current findings also suggest that what may be seen as unethical by one person may be seen as acceptable by another. In a way, the differential views of proselfs and prosocials in our study resemble the debate in the scientific literature about the acceptability of behavioral strategies like deception, where some authors argue that deception is allowed in bargaining, whereas others regard such behavior as unethical (see e.g., Strudler's (1995) remarks on the ethics of deception in bargaining).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 74%

Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining

Dijk

Cremer

Handgraaf

2004

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

149

112

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One of the main issues in research on ultimatum bargaining is whether bargainers are motivated by self-interest or by a concern for fairness. It is difficult to distinguish between both motivations, because it may be in the own interest to make fair offers. In the current paper on ultimatum bargaining, it is investigated whether bargainers are truly motivated to be fair, or whether they merely strategically use fairness as a means to increase their own outcomes. The results of two experimental studies indicate that social value orientations play an important role: strategic use of fairness is mainly displayed by proselfs.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 74%

Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining

Dijk

Cremer

Handgraaf

2004

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology

149

112

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…13 An extreme example of this view is expressed by Carr (1968); see also Dees and Crampton (1991), Strudler (1995), and Dees and Crampton (1995).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental Evidence Relating to the Person-Situation Interactionist Model of Ethical Decision Making

Church¹,

Gaa²,

Nainar³

et al. 2005

Bus Ethics Q

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Abstract:According to a widely credited model in the business ethics literature, ethical decisions are a function of two kinds of factors, personal (individual) and situational, and these factors interact with each other. According to a contrary view of decision making that is widely held in some areas of business research, individuals’ decisions about ethical issues (and subsequent actions) are purely a function of their self-interest.The laboratory experiment reported in this paper provides a test of the person-situation interactionist model, using the general theoretical and experimental framework used in the experimental economics literature. One individual and two situational factors relating to moral intensity were examined which may influence decisions to misrepresent information in the course of business activities.The individual and one situational variable were significantly related to participants’ actions. The interactions among individual and situation variables were not individually significant, although the model including interactions had a much higher level of statistical significance. Gender was significant, both directly and in interaction with moral development, suggesting that it may be worthy of further examination.

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“…Lewicki et al. (Lewicki & Robinson, ; Lewicki & Stark, ) found that many morally ambiguous tactics are perceived as acceptable in negotiations (see also Fulmer, Barry, & Long, ), a finding that is consistent with Carson's () recommendation that “(i)t is usually permissible to misstate one's bargaining position when one has good reason to think that one's negotiating partner is doing the same” (p. 317; see also Strudler, ).…”

Section: The Emotion Deception Modelmentioning

confidence: 72%

The Emotion Deception Model: A Review of Deception in Negotiation and the Role of Emotion in Deception

Gaspar

Schweitzer

2013

Negotiation Conflict Man Res

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Deception is pervasive in negotiations. Negotiations are characterized by information asymmetries, and negotiators often have both opportunities and incentives to mislead their counterparts. Effective negotiators need to contend with the risk of being deceived, effectively respond when they identify deception, and manage the temptation to use deception themselves. In our review of deception research, we integrate emotion research. Emotions are both an antecedent and a consequence of deception, and we introduce the emotion deception model (EDM) to represent these relationships. Our model broadens our understanding of deception in negotiations and accounts for the important role of emotions in the deception decision process.

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On the Ethics of Deception in Negotiation

Cited by 20 publications

References 0 publications

Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining

Social value orientations and the strategic use of fairness in ultimatum bargaining

Experimental Evidence Relating to the Person-Situation Interactionist Model of Ethical Decision Making

The Emotion Deception Model: A Review of Deception in Negotiation and the Role of Emotion in Deception

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