2005
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2005.00280.x
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On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under a Revenue Constraint

Abstract: This paper sets out a duopolistic model to examine the price and welfare equivalence of tariffs and quotas, given the quota rent is equal to the tariff revenue. It shows that the domestic welfare ranking of the two trade policies crucially depends on the relative costs of the domestic and foreign firms; when the domestic firm's relative costs are lower than those of the foreign firm, a quota regime generally leads to a higher welfare level than that of an equivalent tariff regime. This finding contrasts sharpl… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 13 publications
(14 reference statements)
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“…More recently, Matschke (2003) demonstrates that tariffs and quotas can never be equivalent if asymmetric information between firms and governments is taken into account. Chiou et al (2005) show that when the marginal costs of the domestic firm are lower than those of the foreign firm, a quota normally leads to a higher welfare level than that under the equivalent tariff. Chen and Hwang (2006) compare the welfare between an optimal tariff and an optimal quota in a model in which the market is characterized by demand uncertainty and a trade policy comprising either a tariff or a quota which is selected before such uncertainty is revealed.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…More recently, Matschke (2003) demonstrates that tariffs and quotas can never be equivalent if asymmetric information between firms and governments is taken into account. Chiou et al (2005) show that when the marginal costs of the domestic firm are lower than those of the foreign firm, a quota normally leads to a higher welfare level than that under the equivalent tariff. Chen and Hwang (2006) compare the welfare between an optimal tariff and an optimal quota in a model in which the market is characterized by demand uncertainty and a trade policy comprising either a tariff or a quota which is selected before such uncertainty is revealed.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is a common practice in the literature on the tariff–quota equivalence to assume that they are the equal. See, for example, Fung (1989), Matschke (2003), and Chiou et al (2005).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%