On the empirical adequacy of terminological concept theories

Abstract

The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that classical concept theories and hybrids thereof are empirically inadequate for the terminological analysis and description of concepts in a number of sciences. Examples of the classification and definition of minerals in the field of mineralogy are used to illustrate that the defining features of mineral species are typically the attributes of prototype categories; i.e., they are, amongst others, culturally, perceptually, and bodily based, idealized and essentially interactional and functional in nature. Furthermore, it is argued that classification in mineralogy is founded on an experientialist rather than an objectivist epistemology. These factors strengthen the argument for a prototype approach to concept analysis not only in the humanities and the social sciences but also in the so-called natural and pure sciences.

The analysis of concepts in a terminology: a case study of russian and english terms in the field of photonic crystals

“…Considerado o fato de que os conceitos são estruturas essencialmente mentais, e as noções são uma espécie de interface entre consciência e significado; o significado, por sua vez, é refletido na definição. Portanto, os objetos de análise são justamente as definições (ZAWADA;SWEANEPOEL, 1994, p. 255).…”

Preface

“…medical doctors trained in Western bioscience who have to work alongside traditional indigenous medical systems, as well as computer networking specialists). This gives a new and exciting dimension of practical relevance and applicability to the use of CL in the conceptual analysis of the ontology of various domains; see also Zawada and Swanepoel (1995) and Zawada (1994). This is in addition to an already established tradition of the use of CL in language learning and teaching (Taylor, 1993;Pütz, Niemeier and Dirven, 2001).…”

A proposed method for analysing the dynamics of cognition through term variation

“…Among these insights, the new models replace former idealistic, objectivist views and acknowledge the dynamicity of cognitive processes. Scientific categories are now believed to be culturally, bodily and perceptually based, since scientific thought is the result of human experience (Temmerman 2000;Zawada and Swanepoel 1994). Special knowledge is produced by a community that is situated in a cultural, temporal and socio-professional context (Diki-Kidiri 2008;Gaudin 2003).…”