2017
DOI: 10.1515/rle-2016-0008
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On the Economic Effects of Disobeyed Regulation in Employment Law

Abstract: Mandatory restrictions in employment law, seeking to promote the welfare of workers, are debated fiercely. Proponents argue that they protect workers. Opponents believe that they spawn inefficiency and harm workers. Yet all agree that restrictions trigger such effects only when obeyed. This Article challenges the conviction that the welfare effects of mandatory restrictions depend on obedience. We show experimentally that when restrictions are disobeyed, workers’ reservation wages rise, i. e., workers charge h… Show more

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Cited by 1 publication
(2 citation statements)
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“…Overcoming some of these limitations, this study seeks to fill an important gap in the literature by being one of the first to rigorously evaluate a particularly informative case of regulatory strategy, namely one for which the deterrence mechanism of organizations' compliance is ruled out because the regulation is essentially unenforced (and, arguably, unenforceable). Such regulation is fairly common not least in the labor market realm (see Harel et al 2017), and gained topicality in 2020 as governments worldwide began imposing physical distancing requirements on individuals and organizations to curb the spread of COVID-19in many cases with no credible threat of enforcement (e.g., Witte 2020).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Overcoming some of these limitations, this study seeks to fill an important gap in the literature by being one of the first to rigorously evaluate a particularly informative case of regulatory strategy, namely one for which the deterrence mechanism of organizations' compliance is ruled out because the regulation is essentially unenforced (and, arguably, unenforceable). Such regulation is fairly common not least in the labor market realm (see Harel et al 2017), and gained topicality in 2020 as governments worldwide began imposing physical distancing requirements on individuals and organizations to curb the spread of COVID-19in many cases with no credible threat of enforcement (e.g., Witte 2020).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such regulation is fairly common not least in the labor market realm (see Harel et al . 2017), and gained topicality in 2020 as governments worldwide began imposing physical distancing requirements on individuals and organizations to curb the spread of COVID‐19 – in many cases with no credible threat of enforcement (e.g., Witte 2020).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%