On the development of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of imagination and its use for interdisciplinary research

Abstract

In this paper I trace Husserl's transformation of his notion of phantasy from its strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Rejecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pretensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accomplishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a particular scientific paradigm for its experimental investigation; a decision that is best left to the sciences themselves.

Husserlian Phenomenology as a Kind of Introspection

“…Crowell ( 2016 , p. 193) notices that “to recognize […] the fulfillment relation […] is not yet to provide a phenomenology of thinking.” Eidetic variation is no doubt useful to determine whether a sensory experience can correspond to an ideal meaning. In this sense, as Jansen ( 2005 , p. 127) puts it, it can serve “as an illustrative model for experience.” Yet, as the ideal meaning functions also as the criterion to determine the degree of sensory fulfillment , Husserl's phenomenology presupposes, but does not explore, the experience of thoughts themselves. 23…”

“…Categorial intuition plays a key role with regard to Kant's claim that there are synthetic a priori judgments like causality, which need a non-conceptual carrier. In eidetic variation, phantasmata form the intuitive basis of such categorial a priori judgments (see Jansen, 2005 , p. 127). The essential law that a physical thing cannot be visually presented from all sides and distances is an example of a categorial judgment that achieves fulfillment by means of eidetic variation.…”

Imagination and Self Disorders in Schizophrenia: A Review

“…The spectrum of hypotheses aimed at understanding the entanglement of imagination, phantasy, and perception reach from balanced approaches pointing out the intertwining of different modes of intentionalities with imaginative or phantastical intentionalities [29-31] (perceptive intentionalities are always mixed with imaginative ones) to a more radical understanding of the imaginary constitution of the real [32] (perceptive intentionalities can be derived from imaginative or phantastical ones). What is at stake here, according to a recent formulation by Schnell, is a systematic reconsideration of the priority of perceptual intentionality related to other types of intentionalities and, thus, a reconsideration of the role of the objectifying consciousness [27, p. 81; 32-36].…”

Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science

“…In order to make it more obvious that Husserl refers to pictures (and not to mental images) I will use 'picture consciousness' instead. For the considerable changes he made to his earlier position see Jansen (2005). See Stawarska (2005).…”