On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control

Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Heidhues, Paul

doi:10.2139/ssrn.316299

Cited by 13 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…By linear change of variables it can be transformed to a canonical form like Ap LN 2 + Bp LY 2 = C. Also, equation 8needs to be transformed by the same transformation, which will be another quadratic form. The solution will depend on signs of A, B, C and the coefficients in transformed (8). It can be from zero to four solutions.…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Efficiency Defense and Administrative Fuzziness in Merger Regulation

Medvedev

2004

SSRN Journal

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Inclusion of an efficiency defense brings about an asymmetric information problem between an antitrust agency and merging firms concerning efficiencies due to mergers. Effort level and merger type determine the probability of producing the evidence that efficiencies satisfy a consumer welfare standard. The agency minimizes mistakes in its decisions. The model explains the presence of a fuzzy approval rule, i.e. approval probabilities between zero and one. If type I and type II mistakes are perfect substitutes, then only under strict restrictions on exogenous parameters fuzziness is welfare enhancing. If the agency can commit to certain policies or mistakes are non-perfect substitutes, then a fuzzy rule is preferred under wider range of parameters. Zahrnutí efektivity do obhajoby fúze vytvárí problém asymetrické informace mezi antitrustovou agenturou a firmami, kterým jde o zvýšení efektivity po fúzi. Vyvinutéúsilí a typ fúze urcují pravdepodobnost nalezení dukazu, ze efektivita splnuje standard spotrebitelského blahobytu. Agentura minimalizuje chybu svého rozhodnutí. Model vysvetluje prítomnost mlhavého schvalovacího pravidla, tj. pravdepodobnost schválení mezi nulou a jednickou. Pokud chybu I. a II typu jsou perfektní substituty, pouze pri silném omezení exogenních parametru mlhavost pravidla zvyšuje blahobyt. Pokud se agentura muže zavázat k rozhodnutím nebo pokud nejsou chyby perfektní substituty, mlhavé pravidlo je preferováno proširokou množinu parametru.

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Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…presented it -a Nobel Prize winner or an ordinary economist 8 . Their only concern is the presented evidence itself.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Efficiency Defense and Administrative Fuzziness in Merger Regulation

Medvedev

2004

SSRN Journal

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“…Given the period of time which is under consideration in this paper, we take into account the last three presented, the need for merger control appeared, in order to propose remedies or prohibit the mergers that hinder competition and are large enough for this effect to be harmful for the society. When determining the competitive impact of a merger, the competition authority takes into account expected synergies put forward by the merging firms (efficiency defense) (Ormosi, 2012;Lagerlöf and Heidhues, 2005). The common factor of the two legal instruments -merger remedies and efficiency defense -in many jurisdictions is that they both have to be initiated by the merging parties.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Quantitative Analysis of the M&As with Community Dimension in the European Union

Aevoae¹,

Manuela²,

Mardiros³

2018

JRIO

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Given its amplitude, the M&A phenomenon appears to restructure industries or to create companies with a size which was unimaginable, not decades but years ago. As a result, there was an obvious preoccupation of the regulatory commissions for controlling these types of concentrations and to offer remedies, in order for the uncompetitive transactions to be avoided. The purpose of this paper is to present a quantitative analysis of the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) with a community dimension in the European Union, for the 2005-2016 period of time. The analysis will take into account the status of the economies (frontier, secondary emerging, advanced emerging, developed), the position in UE (Eastern and Western), as number of transactions and value, by drawing attention on the most important characteristics of these types of concentrations. We take into account the transactions that received clearance from the European Commission, being reported on the EU's website.

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“…Comparison of the preferred institutional regime to address anti-competitive concerns is a classical, see for exampleLagerlöf and Heidhues (2005) for the case of efficiency defense in merger control.…”

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confidence: 99%

Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty

Gautier

Petit

2018

Eur J Law Econ

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The introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003) has entitled the the European Commission to extensively settle cases of alleged anticompetitive conduct. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement to identify the optimal procedure to remedy cases in a context of partial legal uncertainty (Katsoulacos and Ulph in Eur J Law Econ 41(2):255-282, 2016). We discuss in particular the merits of a policy of selective commitments where firms either take strong commitments or are investigated under the standard infringement procedure.

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On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in Merger Control

Cited by 13 publications

References 28 publications

Efficiency Defense and Administrative Fuzziness in Merger Regulation

Efficiency Defense and Administrative Fuzziness in Merger Regulation

A Quantitative Analysis of the M&As with Community Dimension in the European Union

Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty

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