On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption

Hauk, Esther; Saez-Marti, Maria

doi:10.1006/jeth.2001.2956

Cited by 197 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…As pointed out by some other theoretical papers like Glomm & Ravikumar (1995), Bisin & Verdier (2000) or Hauk & Saez-Marti (2002), multiple equilibria arise due to failures in the expectations coordination. Then, the implementation of public policies or the commitment from authorities may be a solution to these inefficiencies.…”

Section: Corollary 1 When E S and E U ∈ [E E] One Economy That Woulmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…As in Bisin & Verdier (2000) or Hauk & Saez-Marti (2002), we consider that expectations are no longer stationary, and then study the dynamic implications of agents coordination on a particular expectation regarding future environmental quality. We can then claim that:…”

Section: Indeterminacy and Self-fulfilling Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This article is also built on recent models of expectations-driven multiplicity like Saint Paul & Verdier (1997), Bisin & Verdier (2000) or Hauk & Saez-Marti (2002), although we concentrate on more environmental dynamical issues, rather than the mechanism of preferences transmission. Nevertheless, similarly to these papers we investigate the opportunities of public intervention in order to select a unique equilibrium.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection

Raffin¹

2014

Annals of Economics and Statistics

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We develop a model where agents decide wether to invest in additional education according to their expectations regarding future environmental quality. Then, agents vote on a tax that will be used exclusively to finance environmental protection. Under the assumption of rational and constant expectations, the model may generate multiple equilibria. Moreover, we show that agents'expectations regarding future environmental quality may be self-fulfilling when the public policy is endogenous. This paves the way for a public intervention. Hence, we analyse the long-run dynamic implications of a policy in favour of education, in order to select the higher equilibrium.JEL classification: .

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Section: Corollary 1 When E S and E U ∈ [E E] One Economy That Woulmentioning

confidence: 90%

Section: Indeterminacy and Self-fulfilling Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection

Raffin¹

2014

Annals of Economics and Statistics

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“…As Carney (1998) correctly notes, a high tolerance of corruption must not be confused with genuine cultural practices derived from cultural identity. The former is simply bad (wrong) habit that has come to be regarded as socially acceptable and justifiable; see also Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002).…”

Section: Corruption -The Parametersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption, the Southern African Development Community Anti-corruption Protocol and the principal–agent–client model

Carr

2009

International Journal of Law in Context

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Since the 1990s, a number of anti-corruption conventions have been adopted due to pressure from international financial institutions, donor countries and governments of major industrialised nations. One of these conventions is the Anti-corruption Protocol adopted by the Southern African Development Community. This article examines this Convention against the backdrop of the principal-agent-client (PAC) model which influences much of the current anti-corruption measures ranging from legal and civil service reform through to privatisation of the public sector. In focusing on the efforts to fight and prevent corruption through legal and public sector reform, this paper highlights the limitations of externally imposed solutions largely driven by donors. Using Tanzania, a country that has seen extensive technical input from donor agencies in reforming the law and bureaucratic structures, as an illustration, this article argues that the limited success of such donor-driven anti-corruption strategies is attributable to a number of reasons ranging from reform policies of donors and paternalistic attitudes to political shifts and antipathy towards external demands for reforms that are fuelled by the colonial past. This paper recommends that for a recipient country to take ownership of the anti-corruption strategies it is important to tailor the PAC model to the cultural, social and political context of the recipient country so that the solutions are seen as an indigenous initiative, thus enabling sustainable change in attitudes and behaviour.

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“…A related literature attributes time-varying corruption to multiple equilibria (cf. Tirole (1996) and Hauk and Saez-Marti (2002)), and to the depletion of an incumbent's resources in Bicchieri and Duffy (1997).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and power in democracies

Giovannoni

Seidmann

2013

Soc Choice Welf

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According to Acton: "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely". We study the implications of Acton's dictum in models where citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. We argue that combinations of Acton's dictum with various assumptions about citizen sophistication and inter-party commitments generate tight and testable predictions which cover plausible dynamics of government formation in an otherwise stationary environment.

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On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption

Cited by 197 publications

References 7 publications

Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection

Education and the Political Economy of Environmental Protection

Corruption, the Southern African Development Community Anti-corruption Protocol and the principal–agent–client model

Corruption and power in democracies

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