On the crisis of political institutions in India

Abstract

Historical puzzles appear to be generally of two types. Some are about facts~those arising out of our not knowing what had been the case. There is a second kind of historical puzzle in which the difficulty is that we know the facts but not what to do with them. Puzzles about contemporary history are often of the second kind. These problems elicit different kinds of responsein the first, empirical solutions, in the second solutions of an interpretative kind. This essay is an attempt at interpretation, putting together the possible causes, patterns and consequences of a crisis of political institutions in an intelligible design.' 1 As the way something is explained depends logically on what is first shown as being in need of an explanation, and as later explanatory moves always have some collusion with prior descriptive ones, it is necessary to set out the frame in which my questions are posed and sought to be answered. I take my frame to be the marxian political theory; but the way I see it may be controlversial. I think much of the space in marxian political theory is under(leteniined by its general theoretical propositions; and these can be filled in by different explanatory styles (Kaviraj 1984 passim). The argument here is presented in four parts. In the first, I have set out briefly the theoretical frame in which I have tried to work my explanation. In the second, I examine some theories about the historical derivation of political institutions in India, especially some optimistic ones. The third part gives an account of the attempts at institution-making in the first period of Indian politics-its patterns and premises; in the last, I try to analyse why these quasi-institutions have come under increasing pressure.

Rule by Aesthetics: World‐Class City Making in Delhi

“…Thus, with the extension of the state into more vernacular spaces-and the incorporation of bureaucrats of different class backgrounds into the state apparatus-we see the concomitant expansion in the gap between, on the one hand, elite bureaucrats who inhabit the "modernist discourse" of bureaucratic rationality and, on the other hand, lower level personnel "whose 'everyday vernacular discourses' were not structured around principles of formal rationality at all" (Fuller & Harriss, 2000, 8). Because the state "had feet of vernacular clay" (Kaviraj, 1984, quoted in Fuller & Harriss, 2000, elite bureaucrats found their mandates "reinterpreted beyond recognition" by the time they reached the implementation stage "very low down in the bureaucracy" (Kaviraj, 1991, 91). Thus, Kaviraj finds a diversity of political strategies operating both upon and through state institutions.…”

Morality, Corruption and the State: Insights from Jharkhand, Eastern India

“…The most extreme proponents of this argument are Nandy (1998) and Madan (1997) who believe that a Westernised elite imposed alien secular Western institutions over ordinary people who considered religion as the determining principles by which social conduct should be governed. Variants of this argument, albeit less historically and culturally reductionist, are implied in the work of Kaviraj (1984Kaviraj ( , 1991Kaviraj ( , 1997, but also Chatterjee (2004), who following Gramsci argues that the form of the western liberal postcolonial state exported for India by its modernising bourgeoisie was unintelligible for its subaltern populations at the time of Independence. Social transformation was not driven from within society but was a function of domination attempted through a state-bureaucratic agency and a 'passive revolution' that substituted planning for political reform (Kaviraj, 1984(Kaviraj, : 225-227, 1991.…”

Gentrifying the State, Gentrifying Participation: Elite Governance Programs in Delhi

“…Thus, with the extension of the state into more vernacular spaces — and the incorporation of bureaucrats of different class backgrounds into the state apparatus — we see the concomitant expansion in the gap between, on the one hand, elite bureaucrats who inhabit the ‘modernist discourse’ of bureaucratic rationality and, on the other hand, lower‐level personnel ‘whose “everyday vernacular discourses” were not structured around principles of formal rationality at all’ (Fuller and Harriss, 2000: 8). Because the state ‘had feet of vernacular clay’ (Kaviraj, 1984 quoted in Fuller and Harriss, 2000: 8), elite bureaucrats found their mandates ‘reinterpreted beyond recognition’ by the time they reached the implementation stage ‘very low down in the bureaucracy’ (Kaviraj, 1991: 91) 4…”