On the Causality of Great Personalities and Great Events Exemplified by Lenin and the October Revolution

Abstract

Was the October Revolution inevitable? If yes, what was its real character? If not, could it have been avoided or taken a different course? What was the role played in it by Lenin? Using the dialectical method of analysis, an attempt is made to provide answers to these questions. The following points are stressed: (1) Given the general and particular conditions of Russian life created by the First World War and the February Revolution, the break with the old democratic mixed capitalist form and the establishment of the new totalitarian state capitalist form of the social development were inevitable. (2) The fact that this process was headed by Lenin was accidental and, hence, avoidable. (3) But Lenin individualised the general and particular features of the October Revolution in terms of the names of the events associated with the revolution, of the time of its occurrence, of its participants and of their positions during and after the revolution.

Pre‐Soviet, Soviet and post‐Soviet models of economic growth and development

“…That this had not materialized was due to WWI… the war first greatly weakened the monarchy and finally, washed it away from the Russian scene. The political vacuum created by the fall of the monarchy was quickly filled by the Provisional Government, which for a short historical moment (February‐October 1917) was brought to the surface by the flood of these events (Raiklin, 1991a, p. 110). …”

“…But under the conditions of continuing war, the fate of the Provisional Government and the February Republic which created it was sealed as well. Some of the major reasons for this can be summarized as follows (Raiklin, 1991a, p. 112):It had to legalize all political parties formally, because their actual existence within the vacuum of political power brought about by the destruction of monarchy and expressed in the duality of power[8] left the government no other avenue. It had to abrogate all restrictions based on social and class status, because the old feudal order was compromised by the deeds of the monarchy during the war and by the hostility of peasants towards the landed nobility.…”

“…It had to abrogate all restrictions based on social and class status, because the old feudal order was compromised by the deeds of the monarchy during the war and by the hostility of peasants towards the landed nobility. It had to abolish all limitations of a national nature, because … the … intensified national movement towards national equity and self‐determination left it no other choice but to attempt to appease national minorities.It had to continue the war, because it was “a real gold‐mine for industrialists and financiers” (Raiklin, 1991a, p. 126, note 53) protected by the government machinery; because of “the dependence of the Russian war economy in entirety on foreign capital and on government bodies of the allied countries” (Raiklin, 1991a); because of the general mood in the country not against peace but against a separate peace with Germany and Austria; and, finally, because the Provisional Government, had it decided to conclude a separate peace, would not have been able to accomplish this since the duality of power did not allow it to speak for Russia in one voice (Raiklin, 1991a, note 54). And so long as it was forced to continue the war, the Provisional Government could not have solved the ancient Russian problem of land.…”

“…And so long as it was forced to continue the war, the Provisional Government could not have solved the ancient Russian problem of land. Since “Russia's was a peasant army” (Raiklin, 1991a, note 55), to introduce an agrarian reform intended to redistribute the gentry's land to peasants was tantamount to dissolving the army. This is because no force in the world would have been able to prevent the peasant‐soldiers from deserting the army and heading home to get their piece of land.By doing what it had to do and by not doing what it could not do, the Provisional Government … was creating conditions for the destruction of its power.…”

“…It had to continue the war, because it was “a real gold‐mine for industrialists and financiers” (Raiklin, 1991a, p. 126, note 53) protected by the government machinery; because of “the dependence of the Russian war economy in entirety on foreign capital and on government bodies of the allied countries” (Raiklin, 1991a); because of the general mood in the country not against peace but against a separate peace with Germany and Austria; and, finally, because the Provisional Government, had it decided to conclude a separate peace, would not have been able to accomplish this since the duality of power did not allow it to speak for Russia in one voice (Raiklin, 1991a, note 54).…”