On the Banzhaf-like Value for Cooperative Games with Interval Payoffs

Abstract

By using Moore's subtraction operator and a total order on the set of closed intervals, we introduce a new variation of the Banzhaf value for cooperative interval games called the interval Banzhaf-like value which may accommodate the shortcomings of the interval Banzhaf value. We first reveal the relation between this introduced value and the interval Banzhaf value. Then, we present two sets of properties that may be used to determine whether an interval value is median-indifferent to the interval Banzhaf-like value. Finally, in order to overcome the disadvantages of the interval Banzhaf-like value, we propose the contracted interval Banzhaf-like value and give an axiomatization of this proposed value.

Collaborative Resource Sharing Game Based Cloud-Edge Offload Computing Orchestration Scheme

“…Step 6: In the 𝔾 𝒞 game, each individual ℳ negotiates with the 𝔓, sequentially. To decide the offloading service price for each 〈ℳ ℬ 1≤𝑖≤𝑛 , 𝔓〉 pair, the price based utility functions of ℳ ℬ 𝑖 and 𝔓 are defined according to (9), and the 𝑝 ℳ ℬ 𝑖 𝔓 is decided according to (10).…”