On the Anti-paternalist Project of Reconciliation

Abstract

How should anti-paternalists deal with policies that seem to be simultaneously reasonable and paternalistic? In the literature, anti-paternalists have sought to show that many policies that prevent people from harming themselves can be justified without appeal to the good accruing to the people interfered with; that is, without appeal to paternalistic reasons. However, while perhaps identifying sufficient non-paternalistic reasons for supporting these policies under realistic circumstances, anti-paternalists often fail, I argue, to identify satisfactory reasons that adequately reflect our underlying concerns pertaining to such policies. Included in those concerns are arguably the interests and well-being of the people whose choices are restricted by the policy in question. In this way, this article reveals that the strategy of reconciling anti-paternalism with seemingly paternalistic policies is beset by serious problems.

Mitigating Servility: Policies of Egalitarian Self-Relations

“…Yet I believe the disadvantage suffered by those who do not make their claims heard is a weighty concern that a plausible justification of remedying measures ought to track. This is in line with Viki Pedersen's claim that the reasons provided in favor of a policy should adequately reflect the concerns at stake (Pedersen 2019). assumed that political participation positively affects self-regarding attitudes.…”

“…We could thus appeal to the harm principle as a reason to implement rotation schemes. Using a paternalistic justification does not rule out the possibility that relevant non-paternalistic reasons may support the very same policy (Pedersen 2019, 36). Yet I believe the disadvantage suffered by those who do not make their claims heard is a weighty concern that a plausible justification of remedying measures ought to track.…”

I Have Got a Personal Non-identity Problem: On What We Owe Our Future Selves

“…They can try to show that the apparently well-founded restrictions are justifiable in a non-paternalistic manner; i.e. they may try to exploit what has become known as the 'liberal strategy of reconciliation ' (de Marneffe 2006;Feinberg 1986;Pedersen 2019). One instance of such a strategy consists in arguing that the apparently self-regarding act in question, which we find somewhat unsettling, is in fact a sort of 'harm to others'.…”

“…Consider, for example, Irving Kristol's paradigmatic case of gladiator fights where people enter into an agreement of fighting to the death (Feinberg 1988;Ramsay 2017). 1 If such behaviour satisfies relevant criteria of voluntariness, liberals adhering to the harm principle would, apparently, have no good arguments for interfering since well-being or benefits to the agents interfered with is never a good and relevant reason in favour of infringing people's autonomy (Pedersen 2019;Feinberg 1986;Grill 2015). It then seems that liberals will either have to bite the bullet, i.e.…”