Injuries are taken to be an everyday part of sport at all levels. A variety of classifications are set out by sports scientists in order to clarify the mechanical and medical nature and the causes of such injuries. Nevertheless, causal investigations into the nature of injury infliction do not explain the social and psychologically embedded reasons that help us to clarify whether their infliction is intentional or unintentional, other-or self-inflicted. There is at present no vocabulary here for the moral aspects of such events. Hence, the moral aspects of other-inflicted injuries is a particularly ripe area for investigation. In particular, I explore a range of emotional responses to such infliction between guilt, regret, and schadenfreude. In contrast to rationalist ethical theories I develop a position in line with earlier neo-Aristotelian work in relation to virtue ethics in sport. Rather than demonstrating how reason ought to control our emotional responses, in sport as elsewhere, I show how our emotional responses are central to our own ethical maturity. Ethical responses and evaluations are thus configurations of feeling, thinking, and acting at the right time, for the right reason, and in the right degree. These are not reducible to codifiable judgment. I distinguish between the concept of causal and moral responsibility in sporting situations in order to open up a fuller and less rationalistic response to injury infliction. In particular I argue that the subjective guilt, felt as a consequence of the unintentional infliction of a serious injury, is not irrational but a fortiori a sign of moral sensitivity.