On Some Moral Implications of Linguistic Narrativism Theory

Abstract

In this essay we consider the moral claims of one branch of non-realist theory known as linguistic narrativism theory. By highlighting the moral implications of linguistic narrativism theory, we argue that the “moral vision” expressed by this theory can entail, at worst, undesirable moral agnosticism if not related to a transcendental and supra-personal normativity in our moral life. With its appeal to volitionism and intuitionism, the ethical sensitivity of this theory enters into difficulties brought about by several internal tensions as to what morality and moral judgements involve. We contend that the proponents of linguistic narrativism theory must strongly recognize and take responsibility for the “moral vison” their theory professes, in so far as they want to think of their theory as a morally responsible one.

Existential Philosophy of History

“…The need to understand the attitudes toward life that our interpretive strategies lead to inevitably comes to us from the other persons in our lives. Their existence makes it wrong to be heedless of them---to leave our values to intuitions or to will instead of making response to the pathos of other actual people the first concern of philosophy of history (Elgabsi and Gilbert 2020).…”