On social norms and fertility decline

Crook, Nigel

doi:10.1080/00220387808421697

Cited by 23 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…At the early stages of a fertility transition, when deliberate control of fertility is still considered deviant, social influence may constrain behavior that demographers as objective observers assume is in the actors' best interest. Thus, where individuals estimate social disapproval to be strong, even cosmopolitans may hesitate to express or adopt preferences for smaller families (Crook 1978). '3 Similarly, social disapproval of contraception may in part account for a frequently found gap between preferences for fewer children and the absence of contraceptive use that we noted earlier.…”

Section: Social Influencementioning

confidence: 73%

Social Interactions and Contemporary Fertility Transitions

Bongaarts¹,

Watkins²

1996

Population and Development Review

785

549

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Section: Social Influencementioning

confidence: 73%

Social Interactions and Contemporary Fertility Transitions

Bongaarts¹,

Watkins²

1996

Population and Development Review

785

549

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“…This can be interpreted as being consistent with North (1990) in that members of smaller communities depend more on each other for survival and so may rely more on informal rules. Demographics researchers have shown that fertility levels are affected by social norms (Crook, 1978;Munshi & Myaux, 2006;Palivos, 2001) and culture (Cleland & Hobcraft, 1985;Coale & Watkins, 1986). Total fertility may thus be viewed as an outcome of underlying social norms and used as a good proxy.…”

Section: Social Norms and Social Cohesionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Norms, Social Cohesion, and Corporate Governance

Boytsun

Deloof

Matthyssens

2010

Corporate Governance: An International Review

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International audienceManuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: We study the relationship between informal rules (represented by social norms and social cohesion in a community) and corporate governance. A community is a large social unit characterized by a distinct set of informal rules. Specifically, three hypotheses are tested: (1) Communities with stronger social norms will have more open firm-level corporate governance, (2) More socially cohesive communities will have more open firm-level corporate governance, and (3) The relationship between social norms and corporate governance will be mediated by social cohesion. Research Findings/Insights: Unlike previous studies, we use data from a single, culturally diverse country, Ukraine, in order to isolate the effect of informal rules. The country's provinces are used as proxies for communities. We develop our measures of social norms and social cohesion by performing a factor analysis on the measures commonly used in previous research (social capital, religiosity, total fertility, ethnic homogeneity, linguistic homogeneity, and homicide rate). All three hypotheses are supported, whether using composite or individual measures of social norms and cohesion. The mediation is partial, suggesting that the hypothesized effect of social norms on corporate governance may (i) partly come through cohesion and (ii) partly be direct. The results are highly significant and robust, and they hold very well when controlled for economic development, firm characteristics, and industry. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We contribute to the large literature on institutional determinants of corporate governance by proposing that informal rules may have a substantial impact on firm-level corporate governance. We also identify specific sources of informal rules: social norms and cohesion. Testing our insights in other countries and in cross-country settings would help to further understand what rules matter for corporate governance and whether informal rules may substitute for formal rules. Another research opportunity, perhaps best exploited through case-based research, is the deeper enquiry into the very mechanism by which informal rules may affect firm-level corporate governance. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Manipulating informal rules, such as norms and cohesion, is an unlikely option for corporate governance reform. If that is the case, the policy should consist in adjusting the governance system to fit them. As this fit will differ across communities and countries, international convergence of corporate governance appears unlikely. Keywords: Corporate Governance, Institutions, Informal Rules, Social Norms, Social Cohesio

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“…Moreover, researchers and other observers long have known that new users of family planning may not be satisfied: rather, they may alarm their friends by detailing the negative side effects of modern methods that they have perceived [DeClerque et al 1986, Forthingham 1968. Although this aspect has been discussed in the literature at least since Granovetter [1973] introduced the notion of weak and strong ties [e.g., for relevant demographic discussions see Crook 1978, Bongaarts and Watkins 1996, Montgomery and Casterline 1993, Montgomery and Casterline 1996, it has not been addressed within formal analyses on the adoption of contraception. Our analyses in this paper show that if the model is nonlinear, the ambiguous effect of intensifying social interaction is represented in the theoretical framework.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical Assessments of Social Networks, Fertility and Family Planning Programs

Kohler¹,

Behrman²,

Watkins³

2000

DemRes

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Empirical studies of the diffusion of modern methods of family planning have increasing incorporated social interaction within nonlinear models such as logits. But they have not considered the full implications of these nonlinear specifications. This paper considers the implications of using nonlinear models in empirical analyses of the impact of family programs, modulated by social interaction, on reproductive behavior. Three implications of nonlinear models, in comparison with linear models, are developed. (1) With nonlinear models, there may be both low and high contraceptive-use equilibria (i.e., the ultimate level of use of modern family planning that a population can be expected to reach after the effects of a sustained change in a family planning program have worked through the population) rather than just one equilibrium as in linear models. If there are multiple equilibria, then one striking and important result is that a transitory large program effort may move a community from sustained low-to high-level contraceptive use. (2) With nonlinear models the extent to which a social interaction multiplies program efforts depends on whether the community is at a low or high level of contraceptive use rather than being independent of the level of contraceptive use as in linear models. (3) With nonlinear models, intensified social interaction can retard or enhance the diffusion of family planning, in contrast to only enhancing diffusion as within linear models. To clarify these implications, for comparison a simple and more transparent linear model is also discussed. Illustrative estimates are presented of simple linear and nonlinear models for rural Kenya that demonstrate that some of these effects may be considerable.

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On social norms and fertility decline

Cited by 23 publications

References 9 publications

Social Interactions and Contemporary Fertility Transitions

Social Interactions and Contemporary Fertility Transitions

Social Norms, Social Cohesion, and Corporate Governance

Empirical Assessments of Social Networks, Fertility and Family Planning Programs

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