On Shoemaker's Response-Dependent Theory of Responsibility

Abstract

David Shoemaker has recently defended a response‐dependent view of moral responsibility. We critically discuss some aspects of Shoemaker's view.

The importance of self‐knowledge for free action

“…2 2 One reason we should think that these questions can be treated separately is that we can imagine cases in which people act freely but in which, in virtue of their failing to meet some condition required for blameworthiness, we would think they lack the necessary conditions for being morally responsible with respect to some act or omission (Heyndels & De Mesel, 2018; Shoemaker, 2017). For example, one might argue that if I fail to notice an apparently injured person on my way to give a talk for which I am late, I may not be morally responsible for failing to help them in virtue of my not noticing them (Vargas, 2013).…”

The Facts and Practices of Moral Responsibility

“…He claims that his theory is not vulnerable to Todd's challenge (Shoemaker, , p. 483), but he does not explicitly address it in detail. Shoemaker's theory is complex and requires lengthier treatment than we can give it here (but see Heyndels and De Mesel, ). We believe, in short, that the theory has a certain instability, depending on whether one emphasizes the descriptive response ‐element or the normative fittingness ‐element in his fitting response‐dependence account.…”