On Separating the Intellect from the Body: Aristotle's De Anima III.4, 429a10-b5

Sisko, John E.

doi:10.1515/agph.1999.81.3.249

Cited by 27 publications

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“…I shall not attempt to do it justice in this brief overview, as that would complicate matters without contributing significantly to my endeavour. The reader may wish to consult a sample of recent publications from the vast literature on the subject: Modrak (1991), Kahn (1992), Kosman (1992), Frede (1996b), Van der Eijk (1997), Sisko (1999), Caston (1999;, Gerson (2004). ones.⁴ This order equips Aristotle with a reliable criterion for deciding what counts as a capacity of the soul. Namely, one capacity of the soul is the principle of one of these ordered salient activities of living beings.…”

Section: Part I the Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This aligns my understanding of perception in Aristotle closer to that of Lear (1988: 101-16), Ward (1988), Silverman (1989), Bradshow (1997), and Caston (2005). A different interpretation of the quoted characterization of the sense is advocated by Slakey (1961), Sorabji (19711974;, Cohen (1992), Sisko (1996), and Everson (1997). with what they tell us (or fail to tell us) about a certain number of passages in the DA-not to mention other biological works-which suggest that perception does involve material processes. For instance, in DA II.12 424 a 28-32 Aristotle claims that too intense perceptibles destroy sense organs, 'for if the change is stronger than the sense organ, it ruins the logos -that is, the sense-just as the consonance and pitch of the strings are destroyed when plucked violently'.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Aristotle does not think that it is sufficient for an ¹⁷ DA III.4 429 a 31-b 5; cf. Lear (1988: 112) and Sisko (1996). ¹⁸ Other passages in the DA which seem to imply that perception involves material processes are e.g.…”

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Aristotle on the Common Sense

Gregorić

2007

133

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Apart from using our eyes to see and our ears to hear, we regularly and effortlessly perform a number of complex perceptual operations that cannot be explained in terms of the five senses taken individually. Such operations include, for example, perceiving that the same object is white and sweet, noticing the difference between white and sweet, or knowing that one's own senses are active. Observing that other animals must be able to perform such operations, and being unprepared to ascribe any share in rationality to them, Aristotle explained such operations with reference to a higher-order perceptual capacity which unites and monitors the five senses. This capacity is known as the ‘common sense’ (koine aisthesis, sensus communis). Unfortunately, Aristotle provides only scattered and opaque references to this capacity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the exact nature and functions of this capacity have been a matter of perennial controversy. This book offers an extensive and compelling treatment of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense, which has become part and parcel of Western psychological theories from antiquity through to the Middle Ages, and well into the early modern period. This book begins with an introduction to Aristotle's theory of perception and sets up a conceptual framework for the interpretation of textual evidence. In addition to analysing those passages which make explicit mention of the common sense, and drawing out the implications for Aristotle's terminology, this book provides an examination of each function of this Aristotelian faculty.

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Section: Part I the Frameworkmentioning

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Aristotle on the Common Sense

Gregorić

2007

133

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“…(429b3–5) What do these claims mean and why does Aristotle endorse them? I will discuss some of the more important recent attempts to understand Aristotle's reasoning (recent literature includes Shields, “Intentionality and Isomorphism in Aristotle”; Caston, “Aristotle's Argument for Why the Understanding is not Compounded with the Body”; Sisko, “On Separating the Intellect from the Body: Aristotle's De Anima III.4, 429a20–b5”; Polansky, 434–445; Cohoe).…”

Section: The Intellect and Its Lack Of A Bodily Organmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nousin Aristotle'sDe Anima

Cohoe

2014

Philosophy Compass

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I lay out and examine two sharply conflicting interpretations of Aristotle's claims about nous in the De Anima (DA). On the human separability approach, Aristotle is taken to have identified reasons for thinking that the intellect can, in some way, exist on its own. On the naturalist approach, the soul, including intellectual soul, is inseparable from the body of which it is the form. I discuss how proponents of each approach deal with the key texts from the DA, focusing on four of the most important and interesting topics in this area. Two of these topics concern the activity of understanding (noêsis): first, what does Aristotle mean when he claims that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ and, secondly, what role does Aristotle think phantasmata ("images" or "representations") play in understanding something? Two of the topics concern DA 3.5, one of the most difficult passages in Aristotle's corpus: first, what is the nature and role of the productive intellect (nous poiêtikos) introduced there and, secondly, what are this chapter's implications for the question of whether the intellect or intellectual soul can exist apart from the body? I conclude by identifying areas where further research is necessary.

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“…Aristote semble croire que I'usage des <j>uvnla[luTu ne compromet pas la "separation" de I'intellect; que cela soit ou non soutenable ou coherent, c'est une autre histoire (cf. Sisko 1999Sisko et 2000.…”

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Note Sur La Bibliographie Recente (2000-2005) Du De Memoria D’aristote

Veloso¹,

Rey²

2005

Methexis

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On Separating the Intellect from the Body: Aristotle's De Anima III.4, 429a10-b5

Cited by 27 publications

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Aristotle on the Common Sense

Aristotle on the Common Sense

Nousin Aristotle'sDe Anima

Note Sur La Bibliographie Recente (2000-2005) Du De Memoria D’aristote

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