On Self-cognition (svasamvedana) in the Tattvasamgraha

Abstract

Santaraksita quotes many views insisting upon the realistic existence of the external object and points out their absurdity in Bahirarthapariksa or 'the examination of the external object', Tattvasamgraha. It seems that the arguments are mainly divided into two classes: one is on the atom (paramanu) theory and the other is on the cognition (vi jnana) theory. Of these, I will treat here with the latter subject, especially, svasamvedana or ' self-cognition' of cognition, which forms one of the most important characteristics o the viJnana-system in this chapter of Zattvasamgraha. I suppose that we are able to understand the meaning of svasamvedana through seeing the realistic assertion of Kumarila and Santaraksita's refutation to it. In Tattvasamgraha, there are quoted a lots of verses from Sunyavada and Niralambanavada, Slokavarttika of Kumarila. In this Bahirarthapariksa also mainly there quoted a few verses from Sanyavada and (1) criticized thoroughly by Santaraksita.

Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha’s Elaboration of Self-Awareness (svasaṃvedana), and How it Differs from Dharmakīrti’s Exposition of the Concept

“…He maintains (Ś V, śūnyavāda 184ab: vyāpr : tam : cārthasam : vittau jñānam : nātmānam r : cchati) that consciousness, while occupied with one thing-the perceiving of an object-would not at the same time be capable of another, different task, the perceiving of itself. On Ś āntaraks : ita's engagement with this and other of Kumārila's objections to svasam : vedana, see TattSa (2012-2021) and Suganuma (1963). 24 See tam … prakāśayann ayam anubhūyate in footnote 20.…”