On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism.

Epley, Nicholas; Waytz, Adam; Cacioppo, John T.

doi:10.1037/0033-295x.114.4.864

Cited by 2,160 publications

(2,010 citation statements)

References 241 publications

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“…People tend to attribute intentions, motivations, and emotions to agents that are viewed as being anthropomorphic. The degree to which an agent is viewed as possessing human-like qualities can affect how one predicts what the agent will do in the future as well as what its behaviors mean in the present [11].…”

Section: Must Intentions Be Attributed To a Robot?mentioning

confidence: 99%

An Investigation of Responses to Robot-Initiated Touch in a Nursing Context

Chen

King

Thomaz

et al. 2013

Int J of Soc Robotics

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Physical human-robot interaction has the potential to be useful in a number of domains, but this will depend on how people respond to the robot's actions. For some domains, such as healthcare, a robot is likely to initiate physical contact with a person's body. In order to investigate how people respond to this type of interaction, we conducted an experiment with 56 people in which a robotic nurse autonomously touched and wiped each participant's forearm. On average, participants had a favorable response to the first time the robot touched them. However, we found that the perceived intent of the robot significantly influenced people's responses. If people believed that the robot intended to clean their arms, the participants tended to respond more favorably than if they believed the robot intended to comfort them, even though the robot's manipulation behavior was the same. Our results suggest that roboticists should consider this social factor in addition to the mechanics of physical interaction. Surprisingly, we found that participants in our study responded less favorably when given a verbal warning prior to the robot's actions. In addition to these main results, we present post-hoc analyses of participants' galvanic skin responses (GSR), open-ended responses, attitudes towards robots, and responses to a second trial.

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Section: Must Intentions Be Attributed To a Robot?mentioning

confidence: 99%

An Investigation of Responses to Robot-Initiated Touch in a Nursing Context

Chen

King

Thomaz

et al. 2013

Int J of Soc Robotics

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“…The perception of video game characters may thus be similar to the perception of TV or movie characters. Further, human perception research suggests that people automatically identify social entities once they have detected biological motion (Ahlstrom, Blake & Ahlstrom, 1997;Morewedge, Preston & Wegner, 2007), RUNNING HEAD: Virtual Violence and Guilt 5 readily perceive simple action-sequences with artificial objects as social (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004;Heider & Simmel, 1944;Oatley & Yuill, 1985;Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), and anthropomorphize non-human characters (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007;Mar & Macrae, 2006). Given humans' tendency to perceive even simple animated objects in a social way, it seems plausible that the sophisticated display of video game characters will trigger intense social perceptions in users.…”

Section: Different From Playing Chess: the Moral Significance Of Virtmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the anecdotal evidence that some players feel irritated or bad when engaged in inappropriate violent actions in video games (like massacring civilians), suggests that the killing of video game characters is accompanied by more intense social and moral responses than the "killing" of chess figures. readily perceive simple action-sequences with artificial objects as social (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004;Heider & Simmel, 1944;Oatley & Yuill, 1985; Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000), and anthropomorphize non-human characters (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007;Mar & Macrae, 2006). Given humans' tendency to perceive even simple animated objects in a social way, it seems plausible that the sophisticated display of video game characters will trigger intense social perceptions in users.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Just a Game? Unjustified Virtual Violence Produces Guilt in Empathetic Players

Hartmann¹,

Toz²,

Brandon³

2010

Media Psychology

104

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Many avid gamers discount violent conduct in video games as morally insignificant as "it is just a game". However, recent debates among users, regarding video games featuring inappropriate forms of virtual violence, suggest a more complex truth. Two experiments (N 1 = 49, N 2 = 80) examined users' guilt responses in order to explore the moral significance of virtual violence. In both studies, justification of virtual violence and users' trait empathy determined guilt in a structurally similar way to real-world scenarios: people felt guiltier if they engaged in unjustified virtual violence, especially if they were empathetic players. These results show that video games are capable of inducing affective moral responses in users. Accordingly, virtual violence may be considered morally significant action.Keywords: violence, video games, guilt, empathy, justification, morality (Bartle, 2008).Virtual violence may be defined as any behavior intended to do harm to another video game character, who is motivated to avoid the harm-doing (Anderson et al., 2008;Baron & Richardson, 1994). Shooting virtual characters for example, in first-person shooter video games, provides a typical example of virtual violence. While many studies have shown that virtual violence depicted in video games increases aggression in users (Anderson et al., 2010), surprisingly little is known about how users perceive and experience virtual violence themselves (e.g., Scharrer & Leone, 2006, Young & Whitty, 2010.Violent video games are designed for entertainment purposes. Consequently, regular violent game players do not typically feel as though they are doing something wrong when they shoot virtual characters. A frequent argument put forward by avid gamers is that they are well aware that the violence depicted in video games "is not real" (Ladas, 2002). For example, Klimmt, Schmid, Nosper, Vorderer, and Hartmann (2006, see also Whitty, Young, & Goodings, in press) asked avid gamers how they experience virtual violence personally. The majority of players replied that they enjoyed virtual violence as they believe that shooting virtual characters is "just a game" (comparable to chess) and has "nothing to do with killing". This suggests that players maintain a psychologically detached and unaffected stance when playing violent games and that virtual violence is too artificial to be considered morally significant and thus trigger any moral response in the user.RUNNING HEAD: Virtual Violence and Guilt 2 However, Klimmt et al.'s (2006) study suggests that users may also perceive and judge virtual violence in a moral way. In their study, a number of players indicated that they would find it disturbing if they accidentally shot a child, for example, or if painful injuries were depicted in the video game. Related discussion of "inappropriate" virtual violence also exists in the video game community. Many video game-related online blogs and forums recently featured heated debate regarding a mission included in the popular online-role-playing game "...

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“…These vary on a continuum from weak forms, such as identifying similarities between ourselves and the anthropomorphized object (Guthrie 1997) or speaking metaphorically of a nonhuman object, to stronger forms of anthropomorphism whereby the person behaves and endorses the personally-held belief that the non-human agent has humanlike characteristics or traits (Epley et al 2007). Scholars use a variety of indicators for when anthropomorphism is occurring.…”

Section: Defining Anthropomorphismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anthropomorphized species as tools for conservation: utility beyond prosocial, intelligent and suffering species

et al. 2013

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Anthropomorphism has recently emerged in the literature as a useful tool for conservation. Within the current conservation literature, description of the development of anthropomorphisms and the range of species that can be anthropomorphized overlooks established and emerging evidence from anthropological and other social science studies of human-animal relationships. This research shows that people anthropomorphize a very broad range of species, including plants. We discuss how people construct anthropomorphic meanings around species, through a diversity of mechanisms and with both positive and negative effects. We then review the many gradations and forms of anthropomorphism, and some related conceptions in non-Western cultures, which have different types of utility for conservation. Finally we discuss cases where animals are anthropomorphized but with negative outcomes for human-animal interactions and conservation. Limiting the use of anthropomorphism in conservation to prosocial, intelligent, suffering animals risks suggesting that other species are not worthy of conservation because they are not like humans in the ''right'' ways. It would also mean overlooking the application of a powerful tool to the promotion of low-profile species with high biological conservation value. We emphasize that negative outcomes and conflicts with ecosystem-level conservation actions are also possible and need to be carefully managed. Use of anthropomorphism in 123Biodivers Conserv (2013( ) 22:1577( -1589( DOI 10.1007 conservation must take into account how people engage with species and attribute value to their characteristics.

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On seeing human: A three-factor theory of anthropomorphism.

Cited by 2,160 publications

References 241 publications

An Investigation of Responses to Robot-Initiated Touch in a Nursing Context

An Investigation of Responses to Robot-Initiated Touch in a Nursing Context

Just a Game? Unjustified Virtual Violence Produces Guilt in Empathetic Players

Anthropomorphized species as tools for conservation: utility beyond prosocial, intelligent and suffering species

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