On restricted bargaining sets

Hervés-Estévez, Javier; Moreno-Garcı́a, Emma

doi:10.1007/s00182-014-0447-5

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Even in the case of finite dimensional economies, in fact, the examples in Schjødt and Sloth (1994) prove that it is not possible to bound the size of competitive, and hence justified, objections. A deeper analysis of these issues is found in Hervés-Estévez and Moreno-García (2015).…”

Section: Concuding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell’s bargaining set in economies with many commodities

Urbinati

2022

Econ Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This Working Paper is published under the auspices of the Department of Management at Università Ca' Foscari Venezia. Opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and not those of the Department or the University. The Working Paper series is designed to divulge preliminary or incomplete work, circulated to favour discussion and comments. Citation of this paper should consider its provisional nature.

show abstract

Section: Concuding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell’s bargaining set in economies with many commodities

Urbinati

2022

Econ Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This policy is also widespread in the literature. See, among others, Florenzano (1990), Noguchi (2000), Liu and Liu (2014), Pesce (2014) and Bhowmik and Graziano (2015) for the equivalence Walras-Aubin-Core in different frameworks; Hervés-Estévez and Moreno-García (2015), Hervés-Beloso et al (2018) and Graziano et al (2020) for the link between W ei and the bargaining set, and Yang et al (2011) between the bargaining set and the Aubin-core. The paper is organized as follows.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness and fuzzy coalitions

Donnini

Pesce

2021

Int J Game Theory

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we study the problem of a fair redistribution of resources among agents in an exchange economy á la Shitovitz (Econometrica 41:467–501, 1973), with agents’ measure space having both atoms and an atomless sector. We proceed by following the idea of Aubin (Mathematical methods of game economic theory. North-Holland, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1979) to allow for partial participation of individuals in coalitions, that induces an enlargement of the set of ordinary coalitions to the so-called fuzzy or generalized coalitions. We propose a notion of fairness which, besides efficiency, imposes absence of envy towards fuzzy coalitions, and which fully characterizes competitive equilibria and Aubin-core allocations.

show abstract

“…This question was addressed (for continuum economies) by Schjødt and Sloth (), who showed that when one restricts the coalitions participating in objections and counter‐objections to those whose size is arbitrarily small, then the Mas‐Colell bargaining set becomes strictly larger than the original one. Moreover, Hervés‐Estévez and Moreno‐García () showed that, in order to obtain the Mas‐Colell bargaining set in atomless economies, it is not possible to restrict coalitions in the objection process, independently of the kind of restriction we consider.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Some equivalence results for a bargaining set in finite economies

Hervés-Estévez

Moreno-Garcı́a

2018

Int J of Economic Theory

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We present a bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin's () veto and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations, providing a discrete approach to the characterization of competitive equilibria obtained by Mas‐Colell () for continuum economies. We also study how the restriction on the formation of coalitions affects the bargaining set. In the last part of the work, using our equivalence result along with some known characterizations of Walrasian allocations, we state additional interpretations of the bargaining set.

show abstract

On restricted bargaining sets

Cited by 5 publications

References 12 publications

The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell’s bargaining set in economies with many commodities

The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell’s bargaining set in economies with many commodities

Fairness and fuzzy coalitions

Some equivalence results for a bargaining set in finite economies

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About