On question-begging and analytic content

Elgin, Samuel Z.

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1669-4

Synthese

2018

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-017-1669-4

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On question-begging and analytic content

Samuel Z. Elgin

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Cited by 3 publications

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“…The idea of content parthood has been studied by logicians normally in a logic for analytic containment. See, e.g.,Angell (1989),Correia (2004),Fine (2016),Elgin (2020).Russell (1918: 37ff., 47ff.) andWittgenstein (1921: 4.21, 4.221, 4.51, 5, 5.01, 5.3) also drew a similar distinction among propositions.…”

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A puzzle about epistemic value and steps towards a solution

Perrine

2021

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This paper exposits and makes steps towards solving a puzzle about epistemic value. The puzzle is that several principles about the epistemic value of true beliefs and epistemic disvalue of false beliefs are, individually, plausible but, collectively, contradictory. My solution claims that sometimes false beliefs are epistemically valuable. I nonetheless show how my solution is not in deep tension with the Jamesian idea that true beliefs are epistemically valuable and false beliefs are epistemically disvaluable. I conclude by indicating how the results here are relevant to formulating and defending Veritism.

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A puzzle about epistemic value and steps towards a solution

Perrine

2021

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Knowledge is closed under analytic content

Elgin

2021

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I am concerned with epistemic closure—the phenomenon in which some knowledge requires other knowledge. In particular, I defend a version of the closure principle in terms of analyticity; if an agent S knows that p is true and that q is an analytic part of p, then S knows that q. After targeting the relevant notion of analyticity, I argue that this principle accommodates intuitive cases and possesses the theoretical resources to avoid the preface paradox.

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Zavaleta

2023

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On question-begging and analytic content

Cited by 3 publications

References 22 publications

A puzzle about epistemic value and steps towards a solution

A puzzle about epistemic value and steps towards a solution

Knowledge is closed under analytic content

Partial understanding

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