On problem-solving.

Duncker, Karl

doi:10.1037/h0093599

Cited by 2,003 publications

(1,344 citation statements)

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“…Though functional fixedness has typically been characterized as the result of transfer of specific knowledge about habitual object function interfering in problem solving (e.g. Brown, 1989;Duncker, 1945;Flavell et al, 1958;Keane, 1989) there has been no assessment of the interaction between the content or structure of prior knowledge about artifact function and fixedness in problem solving. Here, by presenting tasks with novel objects with newly taught functions, we control the prior acquired knowledge of object function.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…'Functional fixedness' has typically been assumed to be caused by extensive past experience with objects and their habitual functions (e.g. Duncker, 1945;Flavell et al, 1958;Keane, 1989) and inappropriate transfer of extensive knowledge has been implicated more broadly in theories of 'insight' (e.g. Knoblich et al, 2001;Luchins 5 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for bringing to our attention the relevance for these results of a 'depth of processing' framework.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This link was made explicit by German and Defeyter (2000), who studied the impact of artifact concepts on children's performance on a class of objectuse problems made popular by the Gestalt school of psychology (e.g. Duncker, 1945;Maier, 1931). In these tasks, the subject needs to solve a problem using a particular object of known function (variously, a box, a paperclip, a screwdriver, etc.).…”

Section: Problem Solving and The Representation Of Artifact Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because this initial functional fixedness study was carried out using objects with familiar known functions, as has most often been the case in tool use problem-solving tasks conducted with young children (e.g. objects such as hooks and rakes; Brown, 1989;Sobel, 1939) and indeed invariably in functional fixedness tasks with adult participants too (Birch & Rabinowitz, 1951;Divesta & Walls, 1967;Duncker, 1945;Flavell, Cooper, & Loiselle, 1958;Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966;Yonge, 1966), the precise nature of the interaction between accumulated past knowledge, conceptual structure and problem presentation remains unclear. Remarkably, despite the importance of the idea that 'negative transfer of past knowledge' contributes to functional fixedness, there have been no systematic attempts to manipulate the knowledge about object function that participants bring to a functional fixedness problem.…”

Section: Problem Solving and The Representation Of Artifact Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

2003

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The human ability to make tools and use them to solve problems may not be zoologically unique, but it is certainly extraordinary. Yet little is known about the conceptual machinery that makes humans so competent at making and using tools. Do adults and children have concepts specialized for understanding human-made artifacts? If so, are these concepts deployed in attempts to solve novel problems? Here we present new data, derived from problem-solving experiments, which support the following. (i) The structure of the child's concept of artifact function changes profoundly between ages 5 and 7. At age 5, the child's conceptual machinery defines the function of an artifact as any goal a user might have; by age 7, its function is defined by the artifact's typical or intended use.(ii) This conceptual shift has a striking effect on problem-solving performance, i.e. the child's concept of artifact function appears to be deployed in problem solving. (iii) This effect on problem solving is not caused by differences in the amount of knowledge that children have about the typical use of a particular tool; it is mediated by the structure of the child's artifact concept (which organizes and deploys the child's knowledge). In two studies, children between 5 and 7 years of age were matched for their knowledge of what a particular artifact "is for", and then given a problem that can only be solved if that tool is used for an atypical purpose. All children performed well in a baseline condition. But when they were primed by a demonstration of the artifact's typical function, 5-yearold children solved the problem much faster than 6 -7-year-old children. Because all children knew what the tools were for, differences in knowledge alone cannot explain the results. We argue that the older children were slower to solve the problem when the typical function was primed because (i) their artifact concept plays a role in problem solving, and (ii) intended purpose is central to their concept of artifact function, but not to that of the younger children. q

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Problem Solving and The Representation Of Artifact Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Problem Solving and The Representation Of Artifact Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

2003

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“…By using appropriate perceptual information to guide the problem solver, we hope to demonstrate how and why perceptual Nine-dot problem 8 hints can direct attention and increase solution rates dramatically. For instance, guiding attention to the crucial problem elements significantly increases the solution rates of insight problems like Duncker's (1945) tumour problem (Grant & Spivey, 2003;Litchfield & Ball, 2011;Thomas & Lleras, 2007).…”

Section: Nine-dot Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

The dynamics of search, impasse, and representational change provide a coherent explanation of difficulty in the nine-dot problem

Öllinger

Jones

Knoblich³

2013

Psychological Research

107

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The nine-dot problem is often used to demonstrate and explain mental impasse, creativity, and out of the box thinking. The present study investigated the interplay of a restricted initial search space, the likelihood of invoking a representational change, and the subsequent constraining of an unrestricted search space. In three experimental conditions, participants worked on different versions of the nine-dot problem that hinted at removing particular sources of difficulty from the standard problem. The hints were incremental such that the first suggested a possible route for a solution attempt; the second additionally indicated the dot at which lines meet on the solution path; and the final condition also provided non-dot locations that appear in the solution path. The results showed that in the experimental conditions, representational change is encountered more quickly and problems are solved more often than for the control group. We propose a cognitive model that focuses on general problem solving heuristics and representational change to explain problem difficulty.Keywords: Nine-Dot Problem, Insight, Heuristics, Search, Representational Change Nine-dot problem 3There is growing evidence that an insight to the solution of a problem can be characterized by a representational change (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999;Ohlsson, 1984aOhlsson, , 1992Öllinger, Jones, & Knoblich, 2008;Thevenot & Oakhill, 2008). This evidence makes it difficult to explain insight problem solving within the classical information-processing account (Newell & Simon, 1972), where problem solving is understood as search within a well-defined problem space (problem representation). The problem space account has no mechanism to implement a representational change for instances when the current search gets stuck, is insufficient, or does not reduce the distance to the desired goal.There are a few accounts that attempt to remedy this omission. One suggestion is to claim that insight problems are nothing special and therefore representational change plays only a marginal role. For such explanations, problem difficulty relates either to the size of the problem space being overly large and preventing exhaustive search (Kaplan & Simon, 1990), or that problem solvers apply inappropriate heuristics when searching the problem space Ormerod, MacGregor, & Chronicle, 2002). Both accounts miss a cognitive process that addresses the change of the search space. In the first, an additional process is necessary that re-focuses on particular areas of the search space by changing the problem representation; in the second an additional cognitive process is required that changes the search space after repeated failures of the problem solving process.Ohlsson (Knoblich et al., 1999;Ohlsson, 1984aOhlsson, , 1984bOhlsson, , 1992) provided a detailed framework that stressed the importance of a representational change for insight problem solving, and identified impasse as a crucial pre-condition. Moreover, Ohlsson (1992) identified at least three ...

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Understanding the ?cognitive revolution? in psychology

Greenwood

1999

J. Hist. Behav. Sci.

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On problem-solving.

Cited by 2,003 publications

References 7 publications

Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

The dynamics of search, impasse, and representational change provide a coherent explanation of difficulty in the nine-dot problem

Understanding the ?cognitive revolution? in psychology

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