On predictions in retro-causal interpretations of quantum mechanics

Berkovitz, Joseph

doi:10.1016/j.shpsb.2008.08.002

Cited by 18 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Another possibility is that these correlations are arranged through retrocausality. Some authors have considered this possibility as a serious alternative to the interpretation of quantum mechanics (Price, 1996;Wharton, 2007;Berkovitz, 2008;Pegg, 2008;Price, 2008), but it hasn't been given as much attention as it seems to deserve.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, there are logically possible causal hypotheses compatible with the quantum correlations and in which local causality is maintained in one way or another (either through retro-causality (Price, 1996;Pegg, 2008;Price, 2008;Berkovitz, 2008), or through what Bell called "superdeterminism" (Bell, 1987)). Given that local causality is, according to Bell and others, the causal requirement of relativity-our best theory of causal structure-and given the availability of alternatives that maintain it, local causality should not be outright rejected by the causalist.…”

Section: The Bell Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

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Causation, Decision Theory, and Bell’s Theorem: A Quantum Analogue of the Newcomb Problem

Cavalcanti¹

2010

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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I apply some of the lessons from quantum theory, in particular from Bell's theorem, to a debate on the foundations of decision theory and causation. By tracing a formal analogy between the basic assumptions of Causal Decision Theory (CDT)-which was developed partly in response to Newcomb's problem-and those of a Local Hidden Variable (LHV) theory in the context of quantum mechanics, I show that an agent who acts according to CDT and gives any nonzero credence to some possible causal interpretations underlying quantum phenomena should bet against quantum mechanics in some feasible game scenarios involving entangled systems, no matter what evidence they acquire. As a consequence, either the most accepted version of decision theory is wrong, or it provides a practical distinction, in terms of the prescribed behaviour of rational agents, between some metaphysical hypotheses regarding the causal structure underlying quantum mechanics.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Bell Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Causation, Decision Theory, and Bell’s Theorem: A Quantum Analogue of the Newcomb Problem

Cavalcanti¹

2010

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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“…Yet, due to backward causation, the series will be biased, so that there will be a low probability that the longrun frequency of the outcomes of trials will reflect the probability of the outcome in any individual trial. Berkovitz (2008Berkovitz ( , 2011 argues that such scenarios are expected in retro-causal interpretations of quantum mechanics, where closed causal loops occur due to backward causation. Another way to define independent trials is in terms of the outcomes of trials: a series of trials is independent if and only if the probability of the joint outcome of the series factorizes into the probabilities of the individual outcomes.…”

Section: Propensities and Long-run Frequenciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Propensity Interpretation of Probability: A Re-evaluation

Berkovitz

2015

Erkenn

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Single-case and long-run propensity theories are among the main objective interpretations of probability. There have been various objections to these theories, e.g. that it is difficult to explain why propensities should satisfy the probability axioms and, worse, that propensities are at odds with these axioms, that the explication of propensities is circular and accordingly not informative, and that single-case propensities are metaphysical and accordingly non-scientific. We consider various propensity theories of probability and their prospects in light of these objections. We argue that while propensity theories face challenges, these challenges do not undermine their validity as prospective interpretations of probability in science.

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“…λ-independence fails in models of the experiment that postulate retro-causal influences from the measurement events to the source at the emission, so that the distribution of the complete pair-state depends on the measured quantities (for recent discussions of such models, see [32][33][34][35][36], and references therein). In such models, the QM statistics may be accounted for by such retro-causal influences rather than non-locality.…”

Section: Joint Distributions Probabilistic Inequalities and Bell's Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

The World According to de Finetti: On de Finetti’s Theory of Probability and Its Application to Quantum Mechanics

Berkovitz

2011

Probability in Physics

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Abstract. Bruno de Finetti is one of the founding fathers of the subjectivist school of probability, where probabilities are interpreted as rational degrees of belief. His work on the relation between the theorems of probability and rationality is among the corner stones of modern subjective probability theory. De Finetti maintained that rationality requires that degrees of belief be coherent, and he argued that the whole of probability theory could be derived from these coherence conditions. De Finetti's interpretation of probability has been highly influential in science. This paper focuses on the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics. We argue that de Finetti held that the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events depend on their verifiability. Accordingly, the standard coherence conditions of degrees of belief that are familiar from the literature on subjective probability only apply to degrees of belief in events which could (in principle) be jointly verified; and the coherence conditions of degrees of belief in events that cannot be jointly verified are weaker. While the most obvious explanation of de Finetti's verificationism is the influence of positivism, we argue that it could be motivated by the radical subjectivist and instrumental nature of probability in his interpretation; for as it turns out, in this interpretation it is difficult to make sense of the idea of coherent degrees of belief in, and accordingly probabilities of unverifiable events. We then consider the application of this interpretation to quantum mechanics, concentrating on the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment and Bell's theorem.

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On predictions in retro-causal interpretations of quantum mechanics

Cited by 18 publications

References 23 publications

Causation, Decision Theory, and Bell’s Theorem: A Quantum Analogue of the Newcomb Problem

Causation, Decision Theory, and Bell’s Theorem: A Quantum Analogue of the Newcomb Problem

The Propensity Interpretation of Probability: A Re-evaluation

The World According to de Finetti: On de Finetti’s Theory of Probability and Its Application to Quantum Mechanics

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