On popular response to violence during insurgencies

Analytic Modeling of Insurgencies

“…How civilians remember and react to violent actions by both sides -the insurgents and the government -is modeled in [27]. Arguably, the exposure to violence affects the people's sense of security and is a major factor in shaping their allegiance to one side or another.…”

“…A key question is how do people remember violence; is it the first exposure to violence that shapes their behavior or the last such encounter? The dynamic differential-equations model in [27] takes into account the violence intensity ratio of the government and the insurgents, the effectiveness of coercion by the insurgents, the targeting accuracy (see Section 3 above), and the way civilians remember and respond to violence. The main conclusions of the analysis are: (1) Excess violence and poor targeting accuracy may lead to situations where civilians' support for a certain side will vanish; (2) The government should not be discouraged by an initial small level of popular support because there are situations where this would actually play to its advantage if the insurgents are very violent and have poor situational awareness; (3) The effect of the initial distribution of opinions (support or opposition to a certain side) among civilians on the outcome More benefits by insurgents  more contrarians C less supporters A, Change in coercion is negligible  larger per-capita coercion for As.…”

Analytic Modeling of Insurgencies

“…A key question is how do people remember violence; is it the first exposure to violence that shapes their behavior or the last such encounter? The dynamic differential-equations model in [27] takes into account the violence intensity ratio of the government and the insurgents, the effectiveness of coercion by the insurgents, the targeting accuracy (see Section 3 above), and the way civilians remember and respond to violence. The main conclusions of the analysis are: (1) Excess violence and poor targeting accuracy may lead to situations where civilians' support for a certain side will vanish;…”

Bits or shots in combat? The generalized Deitchman model of guerrilla warfare

“…Descriptive models have addressed the effect of civilian collateral casualties generated by the state [7] and by the insurgents [8] on public response and, consequently, on the fate of the insurgency, the impact of collective memory on popular behavior towards the state and the insurgents [9], and the spatial dynamics of such conflicts [10]. Berman et al model COIN as a threeway contest between violent insurgents, a state seeking to minimize violence, and civilians deciding whether to share information with the state [11].…”

“…In Epstein's categorization of reasons to model [18], ours is to illustrate the core dynamics of the trade-off in combat attrition between two parameters: rate of fire, and intelligence. Important questions such as how popular opinion shifts over time, and how it impacts upon the evolution and outcome of a conflict, are dealt with in [7,8,9,10,11,12].…”