2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2014.01.010
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On oil investment and production: A comparison of production sharing contracts and buyback contracts

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Cited by 25 publications
(29 citation statements)
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“…Despite the above, the modeling of international E&E contracts, in terms of the game and optimization theory, has been addressed in the works of Al-Attar and Alomair (2005) on contractual alternatives for NOCs with respect to contractor companies; Feng et al (2014) and Ghandi and Lin (2014) make comparisons between destination countries, according to the strategic assets seen by the contractor companies; Jenik (2005) focuses on the fiscal aspect; and Johnston (2003) and Van Groenendaal and Mazraati (2006) use more comprehensive contractual models. All the works mentioned above depart from Laffont basis regarding the objective functions of the governments (welfare with or without taxes) compared to the regulated companies that maximize profit, considering the variables of adverse selection and cost reduction efforts as endogenous, since they are variables that are not observed by the government or regulator (Laffont, 2005).…”
Section: Relevant Literature On International Oil Contractsmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…Despite the above, the modeling of international E&E contracts, in terms of the game and optimization theory, has been addressed in the works of Al-Attar and Alomair (2005) on contractual alternatives for NOCs with respect to contractor companies; Feng et al (2014) and Ghandi and Lin (2014) make comparisons between destination countries, according to the strategic assets seen by the contractor companies; Jenik (2005) focuses on the fiscal aspect; and Johnston (2003) and Van Groenendaal and Mazraati (2006) use more comprehensive contractual models. All the works mentioned above depart from Laffont basis regarding the objective functions of the governments (welfare with or without taxes) compared to the regulated companies that maximize profit, considering the variables of adverse selection and cost reduction efforts as endogenous, since they are variables that are not observed by the government or regulator (Laffont, 2005).…”
Section: Relevant Literature On International Oil Contractsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to Grunstein (2010), and Feng et al (2014), the interests that can be observed in the contracts respond, at the very least, to the following:…”
Section: Motivations Of the Players In Their Objectivesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The evaluation of an international petroleum exploration project involves a wide range of factors, including oil resources characteristics [3,[33][34][35], the investment environment [4][5][6], and contract terms [36][37][38], which are in turn affected by many sub-factors. The determination process for each factor may have certain deviations and poses risks.…”
Section: Analysis Of Influence Factors For International Oil Exploratmentioning
confidence: 99%