On Newton’s method

Smith, George E.; Miller, David Marshall; Harper, William

doi:10.1007/s11016-013-9745-y

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…I am very grateful to Bill Harper for sharing his brilliant study with me before its publication. For illuminating critical discussion, see Huggett et al (2013).…”

Section: Hegel's Causal Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, Harper's findings show that philosophers must seriously rethink their understandings of empirical evidence and proof within physical theory. Hegel's claim that Newtonian theory proves that gravity is constitutive of matter cannot be dismissed out of hand on the basis of assumed empiricist premises (see Huggett et al 2013;Westphal 2014Westphal , 2016.…”

Section: Newtonian Forces and Scientific Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Causal Realism and the Limits of Empiricism: Some Unexpected Insights from Hegel

Westphal¹

2015

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History

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“…I am very grateful to Bill Harper for sharing his brilliant study with me before its publication. For illuminating critical discussion, see Huggett et al (2013).…”

Section: Hegel's Causal Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Newtonian Forces and Scientific Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Causal Realism and the Limits of Empiricism: Some Unexpected Insights from Hegel

Westphal¹

2015

HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History

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“…153, 155).  For detailed summary, though these too are only summary, see Harper (1989Harper ( , 2002Harper ( , 2009); for critical discussion see Huggett et al (2013). planet orbiting the Sun is constant, although the planet follows an elliptical orbit in which it accelerates when approaching the Sun and decelerates when receding from the Sun. This is Kepler's Second or Areal Law:…”

Section: Newton's Rule 4 and His Causal Realismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today

Westphal¹

2013

Kant Yearbook

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Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason contains an original and powerful semantics of singular, specifically cognitive reference which has important implications for epistemology and for philosophy of science (and which is entirely independent of Transcendental Idealism). Here I argue that Kant’s cognitive semantics directly and strongly supports Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy in ways which support Newton’s realism about gravitational force. I begin with Newton’s Rule 4 and its role in Newton’s justification of realism about gravitational force (§ 1). I then briefly summarize Kant’s semantics of singular cognitive reference (§ 2), and show that it is embedded in, and strongly supports, Newton’s Rule 4, and that it rules out not only Cartesian physics (per Harper) but also Cartesian, infallibilist presumptions about empirical justification generally (§ 3). This result exposes a key fallacy in Bas van Fraassen’s main argument for his anti-realist Constructive Empiricism, and in many common objections to realism (§ 4). These problems reveal yet a further important regard in which Constructive Empiricism is not (so to speak) ‘empirically’ adequate, not even to Classical Newtonian Mechanics (§ 5). This inadequacy of Constructive Empiricism highlights a chronic empiricist misunderstanding of Newton’s mechanics (§ 6). Finally, Kant’s cognitive semantics improves upon the semantic interpretation of scientific theories, and rectifies the presumption that laws of physics literally ‘lie’ (§ 7). Thus Kant and Newton still have invaluable lessons for contemporary philosophy and history of science (§ 8).

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“… 11 See Harper (2011), on which see Hugget et al (2013); see Westphal (2014) on how the Thesis of Singular Cognitive Reference strongly supports Newton's physical analysis and proofs of transeunt gravitational force. On Kant's justification of a transeunt account of physical causality, see Westphal (2004).…”

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confidence: 99%

Hegel's Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant's System of Principles in the 1807Phenomenology of Spirit.

Westphal¹

2015

Hegel Bulletin

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On Newton’s method

Cited by 7 publications

References 8 publications

Causal Realism and the Limits of Empiricism: Some Unexpected Insights from Hegel

Causal Realism and the Limits of Empiricism: Some Unexpected Insights from Hegel

Kant’s Cognitive Semantics, Newton’s Rule 4 of Experimental Philosophy and Scientific Realism Today

Hegel's Pragmatic Critique and Reconstruction of Kant's System of Principles in the 1807Phenomenology of Spirit.

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