On measurable side-channel leaks inside ASIC design primitives

Sugawara, Takeshi; Suzuki, Daisuke; Saeki, Minoru; Shiozaki, Mitsuru; Fujino, Takeshi

doi:10.1007/s13389-014-0078-6

Cited by 17 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…We assume here four attack scenarios: a single microprobe approaching during the sensing period, a larger microprobe approaching during the sensing period, a single microprobe approaching while the supply voltage is being changed, and a single microprobe approaching before the sensing period (i.e., during the sleep period). The first scenario assumes a conventional microprobe-based EM attack, such as the ones described in [15] and [21], where attackers move a microprobe close to the core surface while the sensor is working. The second scenario assumes an attempt to avoid detection by a larger probe crossing the two coils.…”

Section: Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…More surprisingly, the possibility of exploiting leaks inside semi-custom ASICs by such microprobe-based EMA was demonstrated in [21]. This impressive work showed current path and internal gate leaks in a standard cell, and geometric leaks in a memory macro were measurable by placing a magnetic field microprobe on the chip surface.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…To reduce current path and internal gate leaks, a transistor-level countermeasure has also been discussed [21]. Such leaks can be reduced by using transistor-level balancing (hiding).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When the sensor detects an invasion by a probe, the protected cryptographic core immediately moves to an arbitrary safe mode to prevent information leakage. Such sensing is particularly resistant to attacks performed very near or on the surface of cryptographic cores, which are usually assumed for microprobebased EM attacks, such as in [21]. In addition, the countermeasure uses a dual-coil sensor architecture and digital sensor calibration based on lookup table (LUT) programming in order to thwart a variety of microprobe-based EM attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Design Methodology and Validity Verification for a Reactive Countermeasure Against EM Attacks

et al. 2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper presents a standard-cell-based semiautomatic design methodology for a new conceptual countermeasure against electromagnetic (EM) analysis and fault-injection attacks. The countermeasure, called the EM attack sensor, utilizes LC oscillators that react to variations in the EM field around a cryptographic LSI caused by a microprobe brought near the LSI. A dual-coil sensor architecture with digital calibration based on lookup table programming can prevent various microprobe-based EM attacks that cannot be thwarted by conventional countermeasures. All components of the sensor core are semiautomatically designed by standard electronic design automation tools with a fully digital standard cell library and hence minimum design cost. This sensor can therefore be scaled together with the cryptographic LSI to be protected. The sensor prototype is designed based on the proposed methodology together with a 128-bit-key composite AES processor in 0.18-µm CMOS with overheads of only 2 % in area, 9 % in power, and 0.2 % in performance, respectively. The countermeasure has been validated against a variety of EM attack scenarios. In particular, some further experimental results are shown for a detailed discussion.

show abstract

Section: Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“…To reduce current path and internal gate leaks, a transistor-level countermeasure has also been discussed [21]. Such leaks can be reduced by using transistor-level balancing (hiding).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Design Methodology and Validity Verification for a Reactive Countermeasure Against EM Attacks

et al. 2015

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, especially these days the EMA attack method is becoming more and more aggressive unfortunately by exploiting a recent advance in a measurement equipment and a scaled IC technology itself. The attacker exploits a tiny micro EM probe of several 100m-, opens an IC package, and put the probe close proximity on the chip surface as shown in Fig.2 to capture block-and even gate-level local EM radiation [11], namely Local EMA (LEMA) attack. The core duplication [8] and the supply-current equalizer [10] can be easily disabled by capturing the local radiation of sub-redundant core and on-chip power lines, respectively.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

EM attack sensor

Miura

Fujimoto

Nagata

et al. 2015

Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Design Automation Conference

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Smart Card 1234 5678 9012 SMART IC CARD 3456 Mobile Defense Vehicle Server Hardware Security Fig.1 Current existing application field of hardware security. Smart Card 1234 5678 9012 SMART IC CARD 3456 Mobile Defense Vehicle Server Hardware Security Smart Card 1234 5678 9012 SMART IC CARD 3456 Smart Card 1234 5678 9012 SMART IC CARD 3456 1234 5678 9012 SMART IC CARD 3456 Mobile Mobile Defense Vehicle Vehicle Server Hardware Security Hardware Security Fig.1 Current existing application field of hardware security.A side-channel attack exploiting EM-field leakage from a cryptographic processor IC is an existing serious threat to our information society. EM radiation during the IC operation is captured by an EM probe and the correlation to the crypto processing is statistically analyzed to reveal the secret information although it is protected in a software (algorithm) domain. This paper presents a reactive hardware (implementation) domain countermeasure against this EM attack, namely EM attack sensor. An on-chip sensor coil detects EM probe approach and reacts to protect the secret information from the tamper attack. The sensor concept and low-cost digital circuit implementation are reviewed, and the detail of the design-automation methodology highlycompatible to standard EDA tools is presented. A small hardware overhead of the sensor is silicon-proven in an actual 0.18m CMOS test-chip implementation together with a 128bit AES crypto core. The test-chip measurements demonstrate successful sensor operation against the actual EM probe attack.Cryptographic processing is one of the mandatory tools to preserve the information security and privacy. Recent advanced cryptographic algorithms can significantly enhance the security level and the data protection capability is mathematically proven safe in a software (algorithm) domain. However the security hole is often found in a hardware (implementation) domain. The malicious attacker can exploit some physical hardware-related information to break the code. Since all the cryptographic processing is by necessity performed in a hardware IC chip, hardware security would finally be an essential technical challenge.

show abstract

Location, Location, Location: Revisiting Modeling and Exploitation for Location-Based Side Channel Leakages

Andrikos

Batina

Chmielewski

et al. 2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act (Auteurswet) with explicit consent by the author. Dutch law entitles the maker of a short scientific work funded either wholly or partially by Dutch public funds to make that work publicly available for no consideration following a reasonable period of time after the work was first published, provided that clear reference is made to the source of the first publication of the work. This publication is distributed under The Association of Universities in the Netherlands (VSNU) 'Article 25fa implementation' pilot project. In this pilot research outputs of researchers employed by Dutch Universities that comply with the legal requirements of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act are distributed online and free of cost or other barriers in institutional repositories. Research outputs are distributed six months after their first online publication in the original published version and with proper attribution to the source of the original publication.You are permitted to download and use the publication for personal purposes. Please note that you are not allowed to share this article on other platforms, but can link to it. All rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyrights owner(s) of this work. Any use of the publication or parts of it other than authorised under this licence or copyright law is prohibited. Neither Radboud University nor the authors of this publication are liable for any damage resulting from your (re)use of this publication.If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the ma terial

show abstract

On measurable side-channel leaks inside ASIC design primitives

Cited by 17 publications

References 10 publications

Design Methodology and Validity Verification for a Reactive Countermeasure Against EM Attacks

Design Methodology and Validity Verification for a Reactive Countermeasure Against EM Attacks

EM attack sensor

Location, Location, Location: Revisiting Modeling and Exploitation for Location-Based Side Channel Leakages

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About